Let's face the facts that led to this tragic accident:
1) A captain, knowing that in the next hour the plane would be in a more dangerous portion of the flight, ITZ transit, decided to take a rest break. He suggested the PF take the break, but changed his mind when pilot flying says he isn't tired. Then, instead of giving command to the fresh (and more experienced) pilot, he gave it to the 'baby pilot'...even having to ask if he had the correct license to be the Pilot-in-Command! Still find it interesting the first BEA report says he didn't have the right license but the third does...sure that was just a clerical error.
POOR COMMAND DECISION
2) When the autopilot/autothrust kicked off, the plane had a nose-down (or at best level) attitude with reduced engine thrust because of the compensation the autopilot was making in that moment for turbulence. Pitch was not correct, power was not correct so doing nothing would not have been acceptable. The pilot needed to make two immediate corrections, one to correct the roll and the other to correct the slight nose down (or flat) attitude. If he followed standard pitch/power memory items where he would have leveled the wings, put 4-5 degrees of NU and added the bit of power the autos reduced seconds before, he would have been fine. His continued nose-up inputs, even as he is saying he is going back down, shows a very poor understanding and control over the primary flight control, the side-stick. POOR TRAINING
3) Problem came with over-control in BOTH axis. His over-corrections were noticed (in both axis) by the PNF. The PF did not correct the situation and being 'commander' refused to release control to the PNF who seemed to have a better grip on the situation. POOR TRAINING
4) Just before the (real) stall, the airplane was fully recoverable with proper procedures. Again, despite the stall warning and advice from PNF, the training of the PF was not up to the task of simple stall recovery i.e. GET THE NOSE DOWN. Of course, he might have reverted to his 'Normal Law' stall training, holding stick back to get max performance. Too bad he was in 'Alt2 Law' which doesn't give those protections/help. POOR TRAINING
5) After that point, the pilots/aircraft are into the 'Test Pilot' regime. NO ONE could have known the performance of the aircraft in this flight envelope because no one is stupid enough to put this aircraft into that position to get that data. The whole point to training and hiring competent pilots is so they NEVER get into this situation to start and if they do, have been trained with basic flying skills and upset recovery to have a chance to save the plane/passengers and their own lives. NONE of the three pilots on the flight deck at this time had a clue what to do. VERY POOR TRAINING/HIRING/PROMOTING
My take on this accident is the pilots, especially the PF, gave us one of the worst "FAILS" in aviation history. The plane can be blamed for the initial problem, but many crews have walked away from identical incidents. In this case, very poor training on flying at altitude, no teamwork between the two pilots, clueless about the true nature of the emergency etc... If it were me, I'd put 10% on Airbus for the pitots and the way the stall alarm functioned. The other 90% has to go on the pilots which really means Air France and their training/hiring/promotions...
After reading the entire three reports, no way you are getting me on an Air France flight be it an Airbus or Boeing craft... I can accept one pilot messing up under high stress, but for ALL THREE to remain so clueless indicates a BIG problem within Air France IMHO.