GarageYears, re noise simulation - enhanced requirements for training devices.
I recall that the PSM+ICR report identified a similar problem with poor simulation of engine failure sounds / indications. When all of the ‘relevant’ conditions were identified and programmed in simulation, the ability of a pilot to experience them all, would have taken longer than the total simulator sessions in a career.
Crews could end up permanently in the simulator, in ice, approaching the stall, recovering from upsets, etc, etc. All that might be achieved is avoiding the accident that someone else has just had; to avoid the potential for 'the next accident', the training solutions have to be more generic.
Some critical issue w.r.t. ice crystals are knowledge that the conditions exist, and judgement (risk assessment) in avoiding the hazard. Crews must avoid any complacency encouraged by modern technology, e.g. with a better WXR picture the closer that the ‘legal’ Cb misdistance can be flown. Always add a safety margin, ask what if, and have an 'undo' option' (CtrlZ).
Knowledge and judgement are aspects of airmanship – these are the core (or application) of professionalism. These qualities can be taught using a range of example situations, from basic training through refresher training, but perhaps most of all continuously exercised in daily operations with a ‘learning’ debrief – self improvement – striving to be a professional.
SaturnV, I interpreted “… the phenomenon being little known to pilots at the time …” as implying that the A330 engines had not suffered from ice crystal problems thus the safety threat had not been highlighted (A330 engines true/false?).
However, the ice crystal problem could have been known by all A330 crews based on previous pitot incidents with the appropriate dissemination of information – shared experiences / events. Within this I include the EASA decision to accept a delay in modifying pitots (a practicality) on the assumption that a crew could maintain control (in all foreseeable circumstances) for the duration of a ‘short’ encounter and potential loss of speed displays – enabling opportunity for an operator training action check.
The latter conclusion, could be biased by hindsight, but if we can turn that into foresight (foreseeable circumstances) then we might avoid similarly extreme or remote events. Operators should share safety experiences, and then both management and individuals should consider ‘what if’ for a range of scenarios – reinforcing knowledge, providing a basis for situation and risk assessment – a professional approach to operating in the modern world.