@takata/airtren (thanks for your recent posts)
Originally Posted by takata
Agreed 100%. I'll add that, beside being told to avoid stalling, pilots should be informed of what would eventually happen (as precisely as possible) to their systems if they missed the first part of the drill.
Good call.
However how do you identify a
real stall from a
false stall?
Keep in mind that 6-9 months prior to AF447 incident we had a couple of false indication incidents on A330. Were these events fresh in the minds of the AF447 pilots? If so then it might be understandable to ignore stall warning and nose up!
Exhibit A:
QF72 (extract follows...)
At 1240:28, while the aircraft was cruising at 37,000 ft, the autopilot disconnected. From about the same time, there were various aircraft system failure indications. At 1242:27, while the crew was evaluating the situation, the aircraft abruptly pitched nose-down. The aircraft reached a maximum pitch angle of about 8.4° nose-down, and descended 650 ft during the event. After returning the aircraft to 37,000 ft, the crew commenced actions to deal with multiple failure messages. At 1245:08, the aircraft commenced a second uncommanded pitch-down event. The aircraft reached a maximum pitch angle of about 3.5° nose-down, and descended about 400 ft during this second event.
I believe it had failed PFD, false overspeed warn, false stall warn.
Exhibit B:
QF71