VGCM66
CDB even had to check, when he switched with the dozing F/O 37, that F/O 32 was qualified to implicitly take command as the PF (and had been the PF from GIG). Given my vintage, don't even get me started on reinforced crews issues (2 CDBs and 1 F/O, not vice versa!). But save only for the ITCZ (and the CMB that triggered the disaster through the pitot tube failure), it should have been an uneventful systems monitoring leg of the oceanic transit. F/O 37 had not been placed in command as the more "senior" of the two F/Os, and the BEA are criticial of the lack of designated roles for F/O 32 & F/O 37 before CDB departed for his rest break, and note F/O 37's concern at the delays in CDB returning to the cockpit (F/O 37's actions, or lack thereof, are likely to feature further in the final report - psychologists/behaviourists etc).....
Last edited by Welsh Wingman; 4th Aug 2011 at 22:59.