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Old 4th Aug 2011, 01:17
  #1480 (permalink)  
PEI_3721
 
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GarageYears, re #1451
“I suspect you are not really accepting that the system designers have generally NOT considered the region deep into a stall.”

Quite possibly; particularly in the manner in which it is being discussed in this thread.
Certification considers a locked-in deep stall from aircraft geometry aspects, as with a ‘T’ tail, but the A330 stall appears to be ‘locked-in’ due the control system, predominantly trim holding a pro-stall condition. Certification, be it right or wrong, considers that the control condition should not be considered, or if so it is recoverable by crew action


Certification flight tests will examine all aspects of an aircraft’s stalling characteristics, including searching for a ‘deep stall’ on geometrically susceptible aircraft. However, the tests may not evaluate an extreme mis-trimmed condition outside of the normal flight envelope.

Modern designs aircraft have moved toward ‘preventative’ systems. Some stick pushers which I have flown should not to be argued with - high forces, but as in your example, a fearful pilot can overcome such systems. Thus the digital trend is towards avoidance / limiting, but as is being discussed this may not cover all non-normal conditions.
The probability of protective systems failing together with stall AOAs and mis-handling the aircraft clearly exceeds the probabilistic certification assumptions. This is ‘black-swan’ territory where the industry depends, either consciously or not, on the human rescuing the situation.
We celebrate many notable successes. Unfortunately we have to suffer failures; this hurts our pride, beliefs, and our professional standards, and correctly we search for a solution, but as I questioned earlier, do we understand the problem – all aspects of the problem.


I agree that we are bombarded by technology, automation, etc, but adding more to ‘encase’ the pilot will only increase the complexity of an already over complex operational environment.
If technology is to help then it should be in a form as you suggest, releasing the pilot from the technological cage and encouraging cognitive excellence; but if this is achieved via technology, we still have to consider what happens when that technology is unavailable.
In such circumstances the human is still best placed to evaluate and judge the situation; but the human might benefit from some generic skills training to improve awareness, managing surprise, and knowledge recall; aspects of higher professional standards perhaps.
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