JJFFC
2/ Don't forget that neither the PNF nor the Capt. ever knew that the PF made an initial huge nose up => how many of us could have imagine that ?
From CVR release, early in the event PNF was nagging PF to get his nose down, or to stop climbing.
Am I right in saying that on this type if inputs are made on both sidesticks the system will take the algebraic sum of those inputs?
In which case if one pilot was maintaining full and up and the other full down this would equal neutral - not what you need for stall recovery.
Back to "take the controls" if you have to come on to the controls ... CRM issue.
MountainBear:
I have held that
(1) the logic of the stall warning system is flawed
(2) that this accident illustrates the nature of those flaws
(3) that these flaws are one possible explanation for the pilots behavior doing one specific phase of the accident
(4) that the professionals who designed the system should be held accountable for those flaws to the extent they played any role in this accident.
Rational position to take. I'm on board with most of it.
Dozy:
I'd say the extreme AoA was probably fouling the static data from 02:11:47 onwards.
More likely fouling pitot data. Static doesn't tend to be in the airstream, unless they've changed that recently. You don't want to contaminate static air with dynamic pressure, do you?
Originally Posted by houlett
When a french pilot said GAUCHISSEMENT he speak 's about ROLL
Merci, monsieur.
Three miles
If they felt they were fast and descending perhaps they thought this was a high speed stall warning? In which case relaxing the back stick but still mantaining some might make sense.
IMHO the ignorance {me - Ignoring?} of the audible stall warning could only be caused by the pilots assuming, that the stall warning would be triggered by too low speed (instead of AoA).
Speed incorrect -> Stall warning -> ignore it
When the speed came back they had stalled the plane and the speed stayed low => assumption: still incorrect.
Why should they believe now, that the speed was more correct than before?
Why should they believe with all this confusing stuff around them, that any other indication was more correct?
The speed even became lower and lower and the stall warning disappeared at some point. -> continue to ignore all this
Well said.
Kalium:
I wonder what he {captain} would have done if he'd heard nearly a minute's worth of stall warning.
Might have changed his SA, that
.
Mimpe:
When the birds hit the 737 over Manhattan, pretty much the first action fronm Sullenberger was.." My Aircraft".
Good point, but Sully was the Captain.
There was no role ambiguity for him. PNF had that to deal with.
...my concern is that PF may well have been more than just worried about overpeed. Its clear he had lost his initial crucial scan, was overcontrolling, and I feel as the aircraft slowed with zoom climb, may well have crossed the rubicon of lapsing into a sensory interpretation of what the aircraft was doing.
Possible. How often do AF train hand flying on instruments at high altitude? How comfortable was he in that scan and that task?
I feel the decleration he was experiencing in the late stages of the climb, heightened by marked anxiety, probably ended in a somatogravic illusion of acceleration, and persistent nose up inputs unto death ... situation required immediate transfer of control to PNF, whose spatial orientation and understanding of the situation appears clearly superior throughout. No time for egalitarian social norms.
Yes, early on. By the time the Captain got there, he confessed that he wasn't sure what was wrong. His SA hadn't quite deciphered the SW when it was correct.
GerardC
In all, 4 stall warning activations. Would not YOU be confused : nose down -> stall ; nose up -> NO stall.
Was this sort of thing ever practiced in the sim among A330 pilots? Among AF pilots?
This whole scenario reminds me how dependent we are on airspeed as a crosscheck for performance.
ross M:
About auto switching back to normal law protections. (That puts the robot into a struggle with the pilot for control deflection).
As I understand law changes, latching Alt 2 requires substantial effort to revert to normal law. Auto switch is probably not a good idea, from a design perspective, and for any pilot flying.
If you keep getting spurious inputs, auto re-engage would kick you back to Norm Law from Alt Law even if the problem didn't go away.
You could get stuck into the following cycle: Alt Law kick Norm kick Alt kick Norm kick Flicker -- talk about a pain to fly.
Imagine flying with the electric trim kicking on and off, intermittently. Eventually, you secure the trim so it stops doing that to you. (Yes, I've had trim weirdness like that in the dim and distant past. Ended up being a touch of hydraulic contamination. )
RWA: nicely said, thanks. So many good minds at work today!
carlosgustavo:
LONEWOLF_50. I dont know if you are right about the sound of stall inside a stall. All Airbus says on the O. Manual is: WHEN STALL WARNING STOPS PILOT MAY INCREASE BACK PRESS AGAIN IN ORTHER TO RECOVER TRAJECTORY.
I dont for you, but seems To me that if it works as you say Anywhere in the Operations Manual should be a Caution warning that at high AOA stall warning stops. BUT IT DOESNT.
Thanks for tour answer. Is good To learn from others and To share thoughts. Good flights.
The stall warning alpha looks (from my tech info) to trigger stall warning at a value of alpha
less than stall alpha. That tells me you get the warning before you actually hit that critical alpha and stall.
Does that make sense to you? (I may be missing something). It makes sense to me.
For your kind words:
Muchas gracias, carlos, y vaya con Dios.
Originally Posted by somebody
To that point the PNF did not brief CAP that the stall warning had been ringing for a minute.
Aye, he seems to have filtered that noise out.
BOAC:
Out of interest, what happens in this 'computer game' if the one who has 'lost' control then presses the button for the requisite time?
He gets to keep "flying," eh?
