Dozy:
The stall warning sounded continuously from the apogee of the climb (at which point the aircraft approached and entered stall) for 57 seconds, after which point the aircraft was already unrecoverable.
At all, or by this particular crew? I find your confidence in your conclusion misplaced.
At about 10,000 fps, you'd have them at about 25,000 feet after 57 seconds from apogee. That's between two and two and a half minutes to get unstalled, get flying speed, and pull up at something less than 2.5 G.
(BOAC's point on "who would drop the nose 30 degrees" is a good one).
It is recoverable, but maybe not a lead pipe cinch, and it takes deciding that "we are stalled, let's unstall!" as the mind set. That seemed particularly absent in this crew if their verbal cues tell us the story.
It's a personal conclusion, but I think it's logical.
Your personal conclusion is not supported by how aircraft work.
What is tragic, in this case, is that the crew remained "behind" the aircraft, and thus it crashed. (Whether or not the stall warning is why, or other reasons are why, or more in combination, is an unknown).
I am grateful for mm43 puttin his finger on something that has been bugging me for a while, in terms of "what would the recovery look like if a healthy nose down input was made?" There was some angular momentum to the right as it descended, that would sustain until corrected, which brings us to his point:
If the aircraft hadn't become relatively stabilized in the 15° NU attitude with the THS and the elevator positioned as we know, the chances of entering a spiral dive would have been high.
Particularly given the trouble the PF had flying wings level.
Old Carthusian:
This accident is more of a training and culture issue. It is also a psychological issue (I have some thoughts on this but am not going to speculate until I see the final report. I simply do not have the information to back up my suspicions). I will say this - the answer lies in how people react to situations not in how the aircraft is designed or how the man/machine interface operates.
From one pilot to another, referring to the bit I Italicized-- they are inter-related. As variables, they act upon one another. (Won't wander off into how dynamic feedback loops reinforce one another, that analogy is perhaps too far afield).
As noted before, we are in agreement on most of the human factors, specifically in re training.
As to necessary and sufficient issues:
If no pitot icing, no wreck. That should not be glossed over.
If stall warning doesn't cut out or clip at 60 knots (sensed) would that be a critical difference?
Maybe and maybe not.
The apparent non-recognition of stalled condition is a serious issue, which takes us back to training and recency of experience, and even possible mis diagnosis of their situation.
From what we know about the verbal interchanges (we can't see what anyone nodded at or pointed to with those artful Gallic hands
) there is some reason to believe that due to UAS influencing, hence lost confidence in air mass gauges, and something else (task saturation from trying to simply maintain straight and level?), the audio alerts, be they bogus or valid, became background noise within at least two brain housing groups ... and perhaps the Captain's as well. There's where we seem to agree on the psychology and task threshold piece.