We are now tending to go round in circles.
AoA gauge - red herring - even if fitted and crews trained to use it, by the time anyone on 447 got to look at it it would have been severely 'off scale' at 60 degrees and providing little useful information.
All this about stall recovery is partly irrelevant. In my opinion the a/c could have been recovered. I proposed a 'gut feeling' that 15-20,000 ft would have been the lowest practical unstall height to avoid a crash. This would have meant 1 1/2 - 2 minutes to recognise they were stalled. I also suggested that a pitch change to around 30-40 degrees below the horizon was needed to unstall the wings. As someone pointed out, unless you are an aerobat or military fast-jet trained, that would NOT be in the pilots' syllabi, and would depend on the recognition that they were stalled - which was missing. If nose-high, lots or power, high sink rate and lack of correct aileron response did not suggest a stall then there was little hope.
As for the 'discussion' about the significance of 'heading changes', some folk need to look up 'auto-rotation' and the 'effect of a stall'. These are totally irrelevant too.
Apart from technical issues for AB, AF need to sort out how a relief crew is structured, to ensure their pilots can fly aeroplanes and not just computers and make sure that their pilots (in particular F/Os) are given assertiveness training (and probably a few hundred other things too.