1/ " The statistical data shows that, when confronted by a stall,
in 80% of cases, pilots pull back the control column, in a sort of reflex movement, which continues the loss of control."
you can read this in the REPORT on the incident on 24 September 1994 during approach to Orly (94) to the Airbus TAROM
http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/680.pdf
It means that 80% of the crews in the sky couldn't recover from a stall except by chance.
The reaction to a stall warning should become a reflex =>
weekly practice.
Therefore, for the industry, it is
safer to prevent the pilot from being out of the flight enveloppe than to train the pilot to recover, what would need a continuous training as some have proposed here.
This accident is only within the statistic.
2/ Don't forget that neither the PNF nor the Capt. ever knew that the PF made an
initial huge nose up => how many of us could have imagine that ?
In the TAROM incident, the crew could identify that a
human action made the stall.
In AF447, the PF never confess his mistake and it is logical that the PNF and the Captain were looking for
any cause except a human mistake