Zorin, hold on a sec. I did miss your prior question to me. So here goes an answer flown an AB aircraft;
Flight 296 in Paris. I do not think the pilots flew into those trees on purpose.
I think Habsheim is a different discussion, one that's been had exhaustively. Let's stick to AF447 (of which there's plenty of data now to discuss).
Do you think the pilots wanted the THS to go full ANU or do you think the computer assumed one (not both) of the pilots wanted it?
I think they made it pretty clear they wanted nose up. With active autotrim, the bus could indeed deliver a lot.
I say both because who really has command when the side sticks are displaced in different locations? I really do not know.
When both sticks are used the values are added and you get a "Dual Input" warning. If the not flying pilot starts making unannounced simultaneous inputs you're probably having problems that can't be solved by software, though...
In fairness to the PF (whichever one it was) the only 'nose-up input' he (The PF) applied at the onset of the accident was immediately after the sign-off. The BEA states that the 'zoom climb' started at least 11 seconds after that - and there is no mention of the PF moving the stick either way until he applies 'nose-down' to counteract the climb. Does this mean the PF did not cause the climb but it takes several seconds for the AB330 to respond to control movements?
Just to be sure what we're talking about - have you seen the FDR traces in the new interim report? Stick input and climb seem to correlate quite nicely.
Although this question wasn't addressed to me I'm going to answer it.
The question you ask is disingenuous. The complaint is not that the software didn't do what it was supposed to do
Actually that was precisely blcl's complaint, hence my question.
(a) When the airplane is within the flight envelope the stall warning provides an aural communication to the pilots: SILENCE.
(b) when the software decides the airplane is outside established parameters it provide an aural communication to the pilots: STALL STALL STALL
(c) when the software decides that the airplane has so drastically exceeded established parameters that the data should be considered invalid it provides an aural communication to the pilots: SILENCE.
I think we all agree that turning off a stall warning as the stall gets worse is not really a good thing. But was it a main factor? Wasn't the bigger problem probably not that the stall warning stopped, but that there had been no proper reaction to it for nearly a minute before?