Old Carthusian With respect, your resort to a false dichotomy in your response to me is an error. There was indeed something wrong with the aircraft, AND there looks to be something wrong in the handling of that malfunction, which falls in the realm of human factors.
Hand Solo's later point affirms that the hand flying issue need not lead to loss of control, certainly.
Others have likewise commented, which is why a point I also raised was training in Air France. See also Hand Solo's follow on comment:
"Train your crews right and the captain should have no problem leaving the cockpit during ITCZ transit."
My point in response to Dozy had to do with his FALSE statement that there was nothing wrong with the aircraft. YES, there was, the pitot tubes iced up, and that is a fundamental system for any aircraft in flight.
As has been noted for two years on these forums, that by itself need not result in a crash, but it was the triggering event that was the first in the sequence of things going awry until impact with the surface. It is also a contributing cause (from a human factors standpoint) or what looks to be at least one pilot not trusting instruments related to air mass inputs:
Airspeed (which was unreliable at various points)
Stall Warning
VErtical speed
Note, these aren't pure pitot tube inputs, but with AoA not readable, you have to infer something about AoA from your airspeed and attitude, as that's what you've got. Stall speed is what it is for various conditions, thus, if speed is unreliable, might one of the crew think that Stall Warning is spurious? (Then again, the pitch and power chorus will once again sing their usual in three part harmony ... )
There is a known remedy for the sub standard pitot tubes that hadn't been undertaken for that particular hull. To repeat for clarity: not a matter of either or, it's BOTH.
Insofar as the manufacturer is concerned, I am not sure they are clear from related fault (AF looks to get hit with a lot of fault here for the above) since manufacturer's input on training, airworthiness, and documentation is non trivial.
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HazelNuts: many thanks for post 1110.
http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/45687...ml#post6609124 From this I understand that turbulence did increase the challenge for hand flying, somewhat, if your analysis is correct.
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For anyone: (from the CVR) Does this mean the PNF is taking controls in the left seat, or he wants the PF to roll left?
2 h 11 min 38
PNF: Commande à gauche ("Controls to the left")
BOAC: it appears we are thinking similarly here.
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Caveat: what follows involving CVR excerpts is based on partial translation a few pages back, and edited to shorten this long post. Do not take this as gospel, please, gentle readers.
This just struck me:
PF: "I have a problem it's that I no longer have vertical speed"
Does this mean ... VSI (source, static and inertial) on PF display is gone wrong, he doesn't trust it, the value makes no sense to him, or his scan has broken down?
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When I read from the Captain "
it's not possible" I had a chill go down my spine.
2 h 12 min 33 There I'm going up ok so let's go down
2 h 12 min 34 VS : « Stall, stall » + cricket incomplet
2 h 12 min 39 ok, we're in TOGA
2 h 12 min 40 VS : « Stall, stall Stall alarm starts [continues until 2 h 12 min 46]
2 h 12 min 42 PF: In alti[tude] we're at what, here?
2 h 12 min 44 CAP: It's not possible
{Was "how far below the assigned altitude" or "we are stalled" not possible ... }
Two minutes before impact, the Captain appears to have to overcome the denial stage of dealing with an inflight malfunction. (Human factors issue, how people respond to malfunctions and emergencies. Granted, he was trying to catch up to a situation in progress ...)
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PNF: Là tu descends oui You're going down now, yes
CAP: hey you ... you're in ... put put the wings level
PNF: Mets les ailes horizontales Put the wings level
PF: That's what I'm trying to do
**** Question on crew training is: why doesn't PNF take the stick now?*****
Thought, not fact, follows:
At this point in the event, (two minutes before impact) the aircraft may have been saveable with wings level, nose down, and fly out of the stall and then pull up to break descent. Does not look as though PNF's scan was working in the direction that would have led to this course of action. I don't think he realized that the stall warning was
not spurious.)
CAP: Put the wings level
2 h 12 min 59 PF: I'm at the limit of the stick... to the left
CAP: Rudder pedals
2 h 13 min 23 : VS : «
Dual input »
(PNF is on the controls, but doesn't take over the controls. ???)
A minute and a half previously he said
2 h 11 min 38 PNF:
Commande à gauche ("Controls to the left") 2 h 13 min 25
PF: What is... how come we're continuing to descend so fast?
***From CVR, it seems that neither the PNF nor Captain responds with "we are stalled." Ouch.
2 h 13 min 28
PMF: Try to see what you can do with your controls up there. The primaries etc
2 h 13 min 32
PF: At level 100
2 h 13 min 36
PF: 9000 feet
2 h 13 min 38
CAP: Easy with the rudder {PF Still trying to get the wings level?}
2 h 13 min 39
PNF: Climb climb climb climb (remonte / "climb back up")
2 h 13 min 41 :
VS : «
Dual input »
2 h 13 min 43 :
VS : «
Dual input »
2 h 13 min 45 :
VS : «
Dual input »
2 h 13 min 47 :
VS : «
Dual input »
2 h 13 min 40
PF: But I've been pulling to the back stop for a good while
CAP: No no no don't climb back up
PNF: Alors descend
2 h 13 min 45
PNF:
So give the me controls. I have control
About two minutes and 20,000 feet (lost) after..
2 h 11 min 38 PNF: Commande à gauche ("Controls to the left")
(assumes ~ 10,000 fpm decsent average rate ...)
NOTE: If "controls to the left" means at this point in his talking to PF "roll left" then some of my analysis is bogus.
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Owain: Post # 1161, thanks.
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T54: I fear you are too close to right, in re psychology.
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Gonebutnotforgotten:
It seems the BEA are wondering whether reappearances of the FD bars might have had an influence, but if they did, this merely shows how the poor fellow seemed unable to 'look through the bars' to see and assess the underlying attitude.
There may be good explanations for this behaviour, but I am struggling to find them. On the face of it, the question for Air France is whether this skill level is typical (in which case they have a humongous training problem to resolve) or unique to this co-pilot (in which case checking and evaluation needs attention).
I used to hear something about "HUD cripples" who were forced to fly on regular instrument scans ... but won't digress.
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HarryMann: posts #11778. Thanks, clears up a few things.