Originally Posted by
GarageYears
But at the same time would it not be prudent to check the altimeter (which would have been significantly unwinding at this point)? If AF had passed on the bulletin sent by Airbus regarding the problems with the Thales pitots and subsequent UAS incidents, then surely this knowledge should have been - if not at the front of their minds - at least easily accessible?
Don't get me wrong, I have long argued that the situation these guys found themselves in would have required the best of their abilities (a tall order at 2am) and more than a spoonful of luck to diagnose and correct, but if they *had* been able to bring their "A" game, a glance at the power settings and the ADI should have given them a clue as to their predicament. Admittedly this is 20/20 hindsight, but given the Birgenair and Aeroperu incidents 14 years previously - has it not percolated through the piloting fraternity that when you have a UAS situation (and ice is the likely culprit) that the only readings you should rely on are your attitude indicators, thrust settings and altimeter?
Looking at the DFDR sidestick traces, it seems that a nose-up attitude was commanded almost throughout the sequence - why? Did he "tense up" and not realise he was ordering back-stick? I ask this because from my Air Cadet days I remember that stall and back-stick was a no-no.