"According to many prior posts here, the Stall Warning shuts off below 60 kt IAS. Why they have IAS input to SW is beyond me. The DC-10, for example, uses only AOA for SW.
Regardless of IAS, the plane was moving through the air fast enough to keep the AOA vane aligned with the relative wind, even as they were falling like a brick."
I completely agree. As long as the plane is in the air there is always 60 kts of relative wind, even if the angle of attack is so high that the pitot measure wrong speeds. The fact that they certified the logic behind this is for me a huge mistake. As long as the AOA is not insane it doesn't matter. But if the aircraft is capable of 45 degrees AOA, they should do a logic that also works in this case (irrespective of the issue of displaying the AOA info to pilots).
Also, what matters is not the fact that it sounded for 57 seconds straight. What matters is the fact that pilots push the stick forward and then the stall warning sound. If you were piloting this plane with all the other faulty sensors, wouldn't you start to think that the stall warning is faulty too?
This kind of behavior of the stall warning is only caused by the faulty logic, and the BEA does not seem to want to address this...