The previous recovery procedure was based on the fact that all widebody aircraft with hi bypass engines is capable of stall recovery with minimal altitude loss due to quick engine response and massive thrust. If slats is extended at the same time the aircraft can be flown out of the stall without altitude loss if at low level.
An A330 in degraded law at high altitude stalls at 7 degrees AoA (vs 15 degrees at low altitude), max thrust = climb thrust, and the recovery pitch is somewhere between 0 to -5 degrees and requires 4000Žif done correctly. If you do not initiate recovery promptly, but hold the stick back, lack of elevator response will cause the THS to trim nose up, just as the report suggest.
In this situation, if the AoA becomes extreme, you may have to use rudder to get the nose down, and it takes a very low nose down attitude to unload and regain airflow.
Now, with this attitude (more than 20 degrees n.d.), once the airflow is back, the acceleration is huge - especially in manual TOGA - and you [B]must[B] start a smooth recovery immediately while avoiding over-stress ( fortunately the Airbusses have g-meters), secondary stalls and Vmo excursion. Vd excursion with structural failure is a distinct risk.
Recently, we have done the AF profile a number of times in a very good CAE SIM: recovery is possible at 37000Žif done properly. After holding the stick back and letting the THS trim aft, the ensuing deep stall is IMHO not recoverable for the average line pilot, and that brings up a new question:
To which extreme situations shall we select and train commercial line pilots?
Oh, we all want to keep our cosy straight-and-level job, and the operator just want to fill a seat, so the mental break point SIM assessments has gone out of fashion, and no one knows if the co-pilot is really up to it, if the poop hits the fan.
What is left is training, and while some operators are doing a great job, some are not, partly because proper high altitude recovery training takes time, and the allocated training time is already full of NPA, V1 cuts, ECAM work, Evacuations etc. etc.....
Hopefully this tragic event will trigger some thoughts in the training departments and among the regulators, so we can swop some of the endless checklist reading with some hands-on training. Getting extra time....? In your dreams.....
And BTW, 25 years ago I initiated a hi-level training program for the old captains; many of them didnŽt have a clue of what was going on up there unless they had survived a tour on one of the "interesting" fighter types of the day, and only a few of them had actually recovered from a stall in the Starfighter, the Phantom, the Lightning or the Mirage.