Your question to the technologists is surely how could you design a system that would let that happen ?
So what should the aircraft have done differently? One frequent point of criticism is the deactivation of the stall warning at low speeds. That's arguably not a very good idea, yet it should be noted that the pilots managed to ignore nearly a minute of continuous stall warning without the message sinking in...
Another point also picked up by BEA is the lack of an AoA display. Would it have helped? Maybe. But they seem to have looked at only very few indications at all and could make sense of even fewer. My hunch is those who would know what an AoA gauge was telling them in a situation like this wouldn't need one in the first place to figure out 10000fpm down + nose up = oh sh.t.
The transcript is so depressing. It reads like PF didn't only not recognize the stall, but at that moment (I'm sure sitting at is desk, browsing PPRuNe things would have been quite different) he seemed to be totally oblivious to even the concept of stall:
"Qu’est-ce qu’y… comment ça se fait qu’on continue à descendre à fond là?"
"Mais je suis à fond à cabrer depuis tout à l’heure"
"Je cabre ?" - "Ben il faudrait on est à quatre mille pieds"
