Originally Posted by
Lonewolf_50
Dozy, you and I are quoting different parts of the discussion.
Can we try and discuss the same parts?
Sure, although the truth is that I haven't a clue what that exchange signifies and this is probably key to the BEA's recommendation to get more parameters onto the DFDR (like the instrument displays on both sides). If the PF's attitude display was faulty (or not making sense), then logically the first thing to do would be to hand control to the PNF, who seemed to have a better handle on things.
Unfortunately because we can't know that, there will always be a question mark about what caused the PF to make those inputs. Sadly this is a thread that has run through accident investigation for some time, examples being BEA548 - where the FDR explained what happened but there was no CVR to give definitive clues as to why, UA535 - where the FDR was a primitive model that didn't record enough parameters to give a full picture, and Tenerife, where full CVR, FDR and ATC recordings were available but the error was so basic and yet so gargantuan that one of the investigating teams had a tough time believing what they were hearing and seeing. "If we only had that parameter recorded" is a sad lament in an age where we can store hours of nonvolatile audio-visual information on a sliver of metal about the size of a child's little fingernail.
I think ultimately what needs to come out of this is an understanding of the psychology of pressure situations - how one pilot can lose both engines and yet rely on his training to ditch the aircraft in a river and save everyone on board, yet at least two others have lost airspeed indications and been so confused by what their instruments were presenting them with that they stalled an otherwise serviceable airliner into the sea. It's not really a fair comparison, because in the former case all the instruments were working - but it's the level of pressure and knowing that this situation is for real that really interests me. China 006 (The 747SP that went aerobatic over northern California) is another example of instrument perception being clouded by pressure and stress. All three of the flight crew swore that their horizons had tumbled when in fact they had not.