Thanks
jcjeant for the full report link. It took a couple of hours to read it. I'm impressed by the notion of confusion sorted out from the transcript of the CVR and for the pilot's actions during those four minutes before impact. But I'm much more impressed by the avalanche of contradicting feelings they went through.
I remember when I was flying "honest" aircrafts. A failure was really a "single" failure. One would continue flying the bird while PNF or FE would sort out the check-list. Today, a "simple failure" may turn a good day into an holocaust.
Those pilots never realized they were in a Stall.
It started out with poor airmanship and ended the way we all know.
All three of them were very confused and unable to "read" what was going on.
The PF, (the first-officer on the RH Seat) even stated so, at least twice: (…)
je n’ai plus le
contrôle de l’avion là
J’ai plus du tout le
contrôle de l’avion
"I don't have control of the airplane, I definitely have no control of the airplane"
and he is still on doubt about what was going on at time: 2h12:04..07
J’ai l’impression qu’on
a une vitesse de fou
non qu’est-ce que vous
en pensez ?
"I have the impression that we have a crazy speed, what do you think about that?"
(Spoilers were even deployed by this time, but the second officer told him not to deploy them).
IMHO contributing factors were:
- the decision of the Captain to take his resting period before crossing ITCZ;
- poor airmanship;
- the Stall Warning logic (intermittent behavior);
- the complexity of the FBW system
- lack of AoA information
- poor handling proficiency
Hope we all learn from that.
Hope been-counters will learn something also.