Dozy
Way back when I started commenting on these threads earlier in the year I said that unreliable instrument readings in the wee hours at night, in IMC with unsettled weather hundreds of miles from land was a nightmare situation for any pilot to confront, and that any findings of mishandling on the part of the pilots *must* take this factor into account, and this is why I got very agitated when people said that by saying software failure was unlikely to be a cause I was blaming the pilots.
Absolutely. Which is why my favourite training philosophy has always been KISS (keep it simple, stupid), to cater for the worst case/lowest common denominator scenario.
Levelvibes.
Who can please shed some light on the copilot´s deficient training the BEA report states.
"The copilots had received no high altitude training for the "Unreliable IAS" procedure and manual aircraft handling".
I find it hard to believe this. Isn´t this training absolute standard in any simulator training of any serious airline?
Am I missing anything?
Well, I thought this quote was rather surprising from the report---
"
In an interview, Eric Schramm, executive vice president for flight operations at Air France and a Boeing 777 captain, contested the need for such training. “There is not a big difference between high altitude and low altitude” in manual flight, Mr. Schramm said. “It is not a very important topic for us.” ---
Really?! Wonder how much high altitude manual flying he's done, (and I'm not talking about simply keeping the aircraft straight and level, unlike what these guys had to deal with).
In the miliitary, we had lots of practice, and I can tell you it was not as easy as it might sound. A small pitch input that would normally be of no consequence at low altitudes would quickly put you in stickshaker zone high up, especially if you had made the mistake of climbing way above your optimum (buffet margin) level.
Not that these matters concerned us at the time; (no SLF to worry about)
. Different matter these days...