and there is a recommendation for an AoA display, which will be down to Airbus and Boeing to implement
IIRC from our discussions a few threads ago, AoA can be called up already on one of the pages (maintenance?). Perhaps a short term fix is to use the software to add AoA to the opening of the F/CTL page which shows position of the THS and Rudder, etc. Granted, that puts the PNF in the role of advising PF of AoA, rather than putting it into scan. While that's not how I would do it, might be a decent short term fix. (Opinions?)
Second: where on the vertical display real estate is a good place for an AoA gauge? Opinions will differ.
Gratifying to see the BEA seems to agree with something that had me scratching my head.
Note: the training issue leaps to the fore.
PostScipt:
Seeing as captain off duty happens rather frequently on long haul, it's slightly suprising (well, to me...) that there is no CRM training for the rest of the crew in that situation. Poor CRM is then unsuprising.
CRM shortfall in terms of "Captain's at rest, how do we coordinate our efforts when we need him" an interesting point I had not thought about. I would have assumed that AF has a drill for that case. Good for the analysis effort to consider that area.
It should be noted that the misleading stopping and starting of the stall warning alarm, contradicting the actual state of the aircraft, greatly contributed to the crew’s difficulty in analyzing the situation.
Begins to look like the compound emergency/malfunction scenario, perhaps, in the eye of the crew.
"Crap, the AS is going squirrely, look, SW is sounding, must be from bad AS, look, x is wrong ... "
A A310, Tarom, ... recovered at 800 ft, ... from an uncontrolled climb and stall at 4100ft, pitch of 60 degrees, and airspeed of 30knots ... very quick, proper ND, and roll, aggressive reactions from the pilots ... one could even say that at 10000ft there was hope.
I doubt that aircraft developed a 10,000 fpm rate of descent. (And good thing, the pilots reacted promptly!
Overcoming that 10,000 fpm from first unstalling, then getting knots on, then recovering with a nice firm pull without heading toward accelerated stall, since you are not in Normal Law ... how much altitude that takes is a question worth thinking through.
A clearer statement would be "the pilots were unable to recover from the stall" for whatever reason whether it be lack of training, not realisung they were fully stalled, simple panic or a combination of these and other factors.
That's a clue to what the crew were seeing and understanding from what they saw. (Was PNF head down in ECAMS pages or was his scan on flight instruments? We will probably never know. Is that how PNF's roles are trained? )
Personally, although AF is not impartial I think this point is very important. I think the pilots disbelieved the stall warning from the start. In fact I think the very first stall warning, which came only a few seconds after AP disconnect, was a bogus warning caused by UAS.
How well does this sort of malfunction get covered in the sim training?
When interrelated elements of a system both go bad, what logic tree or symptom troubleshooting is taught?