PJ2
By the phrase, I was assuming a great deal on the part of the reader. What I meant was, other than maintaining level flight as best one can using pitch and manual thrust settings, (which would be those which existed just prior to the failure), one "does nothing" in terms of climbing/turning/descending etc. Above all else, one stabilizes the aircraft in level flight. There is absolutely NO reason to change anything during a UAS event.
Can I -- a non-pilot -- tentatively challenge this wording.
There seem to be at least two situations where the current settings would not be
"those which existed just prior to the failure":
a) The s/w "correctly" changed something. [e.g. IIRC the thrust changes on a/p drop-out].
b) The s/w has "inappropriately" (in 20:20 hindsight) modified the previous status-quo prior to the fully-recognised UAS event. [e.g. as a "correct" response to erroneous airspeed values.]
In either case the pilot needs to
revert to something like the settings in effect before the s/w acted. In this situation "
one stabilizes the aircraft in level flight" and "
there is absolutely NO reason to change anything during a UAS event" would seem to be mutually inconsistent.
BTW I suspect that our positions could be reconciled by some sort of differentiation between "simple" and "complex/compound" UAS events.
As a retired s/w engineer, and assuming dual pitot failure:
If the 2nd pitot failure occurring
while the 1st pitot failure was being analysed the s/w developers can be forgiven for failing to handle it "well". Especially as the s/w development team probably believed/were-told that double in-flight pitot failures were vanishingly improbable.
This could easily cause a brief period of erroneous airspeed, leading to: thrust changes, trim changes and a/p drop-out. Leaving the plane some way from steady-state-cruise settings.