Bearfoil, for once I'll inject an icon:
Of course, the FCOM mentions the possibility of a radome getting damaged or lost. Such an event would greatly influence airflow around the nose of the aircraft and would thus adversely influence the pressure measurements as taken by the various pressure sensors mounted around the nose. But FCOM mentions a zillion possible failures.
The BEA Interim Report number 1 mentioned an estimate of aircraft state at impact, based exclusively on damage patterns found on floating debris - almost 2 years later, the recorders proved that the original estimate was remarkably accurate.
Part of the original estimate, was parts of the radome found at sea.
Quote from Interim report 1:
Observations of the tail fin and on the parts from the passenger (galley, toilet door, crew rest module) showed that the airplane had likely struck the surface of the water in a straight line, with a high rate vertical acceleration.
Quote from Interim report 2:
From these observations it can be deduced that:
* The aircraft was probably intact on impact.
* The aircraft struck the surface of the water with a positive attitude, a low
bank and a high rate of descent.
* There was no depressurisation.
I think you can TRUST the BEA that, had there been grounds to suspect that the radome was lost, they would have mentioned it in their reports so far.
To the rest:
Whether it is conceivable that pilots somehow make an error with regards to stall reactions? Yes, it happens, even in good old fashioned Boeings!
Heavy take-off, during flap retraction an upgust underneath a big Cu (note: I do not state Cb), as margin at that moment is very small, it triggers a stick shaker.
PF reaction? Pull up the nose slightly. PNF intervenes, so nose is lowered, a/c continues flight uneventfully.
Query by the PNF (the commander) about the reaction of the PF - well, it pointed to a sort of mix up of the text from GPWS/Windshear procedures, that speak of pulling up, with the stick shaker as upper limit of that action. So, somehow, in the PF's mind, there had formed a connention of "stick shaker, pull up".
More strange reactions in pilots minds: read up in an old Boeing magazine about the 767 that took off from Isla Margarita (1994 or 1995) and turned directly towards the 3.300 ft high mountain on the island. The GPWS calls caused a PF reaction of increasing pitch by 1 degree. Only after the audible impact with a TV antenna on the mountain top, did he progress into a proper GPWS reaction.
Once again: 15 degrees nose up, clearly visible on those beautiful PFD's, is very, very unusual attitude in a transport aircraft around FL350. All recorded pilot actions should have been very much nose down. All sorts of failure flags on the PFD and messages on ECAM should not have distracted the crew from the still perfect attitude indications.
And, as said by many before, the mighty "push" of TOGA at FL350 is nothing more than CLB thrust at that altitude, and as such a disappointingly small amount above normal cruise thrust. Certainly not a big handful of pitch up moment.