Any chance the stabilizer jammed or otherwise stayed in full up position (by design) like Ci Nagoya crash?
Accident Database: Accident Synopsis 04261994
excerpts from Ladkins report on the Ci TAipei Crash pertaining to the Ci Nagoya crash (both crashes the same type of aircraft)
The Crash of Flight CI676, a China Airlines Airbus A300, Taipei, Taiwan, Monday 16 February, 1998: What We Know So Far
"[02.19]
On 26 April 1994, an Airbus A300-600 crashed tail-first while trying to land at the airport in Nagoya, Japan. The co-pilot, who was flying, had inadvertently triggered the Take-off/Go-around (TOGA) switch on the engine power levers. This caused the Flight Director (an advisory device on the Attitude Indicator) to switch to GO-AROUND mode, and increased thrust on the engines. The autopilots were subsequently engaged, with GO-AROUND mode still engaged. The co-pilot applied heavy nose-down forces to the control column under the Captain's instructions, and continued to do so. The autopilot on this A300 did not disengage under these forces, specifically because of its design. Thus it attempted to counteract the nose-down attitude of the aircraft by putting in nose-up trim on the Horizontal Stabiliser (the moveable, horizontal part of the tailplane, the empennage), causing an abnormal out-of-trim situation. The copilot and the autopilot were thus fighting each other. The captain took over control, judged that landing would be difficult, and opted for a go-around. The abnormal nose-up trim caused the aircraft to pitch up drastically, losing airspeed very quickly, stall, and impact the ground tail-first. The final report from the Japanese authorities singled out 12 causal factors. I quote in full from the report. My comments are in parentheses with the form "[..... PBL]"
While the aircraft was making an ILS approach to Runway 34 of Nagoya Airport, under manual control by the F/O [First Officer PBL], the F/O inadvertently activated the GO [GO-AROUND PBL] lever [positioned on the thrust levers PBL], which changed the FD (Flight Director) to GO AROUND mode and caused a thrust increase. This made the aircraft deviate above its normal glide path.
The APs [Autopilots PBL] were subsequently engaged, with GO AROUND mode still engaged. Under these conditions the F/O continued pushing the control wheel in accordance with the CAP's [Captain's PBL] instructions. As a result of this, the THS (Horizontal Stabilizer) [the horizontal part of the tailplane, the empennage PBL] moved to its full nose-up position and caused an abnormal out-of-trim situation.
The crew continued approach, unaware of the abnormal situation. The AOA increased, the Alpha Floor function [a particular automatic control function intended for situations in which a high angle-of-attack (AOA), the incidence of the wings to the air, is very high. A high AOA leads to a stall PBL] was activated and the pitch angle increased.
It is considered that, at this time, the CAP (who had now taken the controls), judged that landing would be difficult and opted for go-around. The aircraft began to climb steeply with a high pitch angle attitude. The CAP and the F/O did not carry out an effective recovery operation, and the aircraft stalled and crashed.
The AAIC [Japanese Air Accident Investigation Commission PBL] determined that the following factors, as a chain or a combination thereof, caused the accident:
The F/O inadvertently triggered the Go lever It is considered that the design of the GO lever contributed to it: normal operation of the thrust lever allows the possibility of an inadvertent triggering of the GO lever.
The crew engaged the APs while GO AROUND mode was still engaged, and continued approach.
The F/O continued pushing the control wheel in accordance with the CAP's instructions, despite its strong resistive force, in order to continue the approach.
The movement of the THS conflicted with that of the elevators, causing an abnormal out-of-trim situation.
There was no warning and recognition function to alert the crew directly and actively to the onset of the abnormal out-of-trim condition.
The CAP and F/O did not sufficiently understand the FD mode change and the AP override function. It is considered that unclear descriptions of the AFS (Automatic Flight System) in the FCOM (Flight Crew Operating Manual) prepared by the aircraft manufacturer contributed to this.
The CAP's judgment of the flight situation while continuing approach was inadequate, control take-over was delayed, and appropriate actions were not taken.
The Alpha-Floor function was activated; this was incompatible with the abnormal out-of-trim situation, and generated a large pitch-up moment. This narrowed the range of selection for recovery operations and reduced the time allowance for such operations.
The CAP's and F/O's awareness of the flight conditions, after the PlC took over the controls and during their recovery operation, was inadequate respectively.
Crew coordination between the CAP and the F/O was inadequate.
The modification prescribed in Service Bulletin SB A300-22-6021 had not been incorporated into the aircraft.
The aircraft manufacturer did not categorise the SB A300-22-6021 as "Mandatory", which would have given it the highest priority. The airworthiness authority of the nation of design and manufacture did not issue promptly an airworthiness directive pertaining to implementation of the above SB.
It should be fairly clear that most of these causal factors pertain to the crew's actions and understanding of the aircraft systems. However, contributing were unclear manual descriptions (also a factor in the Lufthansa Warsaw A320 crash in 1993 and the Birgenair Puerto Plata B757 crash in 1996), and the placement and design of the GO-AROUND lever on the thrust levers. Also that China Airlines had not performed a recommended modification to the aircraft.
The modification has to do with pilot inputs to the con......."
Remote but was there any failure between man and machine that locked the rear stabilizer in full up by any chance on AF 447 ?