Answering the question: 'Why no helo transport...?'
This has been a thought provoking thread in multiple respects, although a bit marred. The subject question has perhaps been circuitously answered, but here is my crystallisation.
The principal reason has been failure to progressively upgrade/optimise in-service hardware to maintain a continual adequate and credible level of military preparedness. For example; what upgrades have been necessary to Chinook and Blackhawk before they could be deployed on operations?
A secondary reason has been the decline in on-line availability of battlefield helo resources since those assets were transferred from Air Force to Army Aviation in 1989, which has had wide-ranging negative consequences concerning Army field units helicopter training in particular. According to Canberra sources, AAAvn has at times struggled to continually maintain the Chinook detachment in Afghanistan, Blackhawks in East Timor and at Holdsworthy NSW.
The military capacity of all 3 Services was materially weakened by deliberate technical de-skilling and outsourcing of maintenance, as evidenced by the prevailing diabolical situation regarding availability of RAN warships. The RAAF generally does better in terms of aircraft assets availability; but so it should, having been created 90 years ago to provide air services for all 3 armed forces.
The absurd Aerospace Capability Implementation Roadmap – Rotary Wing (ACIR-RW) - a new grandly bureaucratic title - has created glaring capability gaps. This deficient planning was spawned by the Helicopter Systems Division of DMO when headed by AAAvn and completely forsakes operational readiness and cost-effectiveness considerations. That it has been allowed to progress reflects poorly on ADF leadership.
Comments this thread by some from whatever Service regarding 'a pissing contest', handbags, Officers, immature, etcetera are pretty tawdry. For decades now and when still serving, my historical efforts have been directed toward countering a plethora of misinformation concerning Air Force operations in general, including 9SQN activities during the Vietnam War. The problem is thousands of documents have since been generated - including by so-called historians - somewhat based on higher level commander opinions (often seen differently at operating levels), hearsay and third hand accounts which become further distorted when they are used as reference material by authors of publications downstream. If misinformation is repeated often and long enough, it becomes the accepted truth.
Shark 06; I mentioned my times in Vietnam to indicate that I got a fairly broad overview of that campaign, which lasted longer than WW2 for Australian forces. I have seen heated arguments between colleagues regarding how things were done because happenings during their (mostly) single tours in differing time-frames are indelibly imprinted in their brains. War is seldom static and they usually failed to realise that a whole bunch of things changed regarding operating practices or whatever as the campaign moved along.
9SQN enjoyed good rapport with Australian Army aviators - except for a few older corps members - and many enduring friendships evolved. Of course we understood the nature of their operations and they were most welcome to stay with us at Vung Tau, some doing so when they could escape from Nui Dat. And; those of us who represented the Task Force Air Commander at HQ 1ATF were obliged to appreciate the broad nature of how all the air components functioned.
Some seem enthralled by writings on the Fourays website: www.fourays.org. Suffice to say here that some misinformation propagated there regarding the Air Force has already been discredited on this thread and you will find presentation of a Fourays feature articles paper by Wing Commander Martin Sharp, RAF on this more appropriate thread: http://www.pprune.org/military-aircr...s-history.html at posts #1,2,3; with my critique at posts #16,20,31. See also the first-hand account of the helo transfer decision by Air Marshal Jake Newham at post #12.
Consider the following statement from another Fourays feature article The Tactical Air Support Group, Part 3:
'...It could be said that apart from the Caribou Squadron, RAAF involvement in Vietnam was almost inconsequential to the conduct of Australian ground operations in a war that was essentially a ground conflict...'
Air Force Caribou did a great job during almost 8 years in Vietnam, largely in support of US Special Forces/Vietnamese military activities; and about 4 years of Canberra bombing involvement, including close air support for 1ATF, is outlined here: RAAF Association National Council - Special Topics - 2 SQN Canberras in Vietnam . The C-130 squadrons also contributed substantially in medevac and logistic support roles, as did LRMP aircraft in largely unspoken activities. 9SQN flew, 58,768 hours over 5.5 years (2,000 days), the highest effort for any RAAF unit in any campaign during the entire 90 year history of the Service. That effort was overwhelmingly in support of 1ATF.
The credibility of The Tactical Air Support Group paper is thus called into question.
End of my engagement this thread and I will soon post some more enlightening material at: http://www.pprune.org/military-aircr...s-history.html, for public record purposes.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 22nd Jul 2011 at 22:48.