Originally Posted by
ChristiaanJ
Dehaene, jcjeant,
Many thanks for the link to the report.
Haven't quite finished reading it yet, especially since it needs an awful amount of "reading between the lines".
I find the report quite telling. Working in a bigger company myself I háve the feeling I don't need too much reading between the lines to get an idea of the general 'culture'.
Surely it does not explain the AF447 accident in any direct way.
On the other hand it conveys a slight sense of a relatively strong hierarchy within an 'elitist' group and certain mistrust in other's abilities.
Statements coming from Pilots about Captains being 'immune' to their line managers implicitely point to a rather steep hierarchy in the cockpit.
In general such a spirit does not help a good workload sharing in case of high workload/stress.
Also mentioned is a slight tendency to 'Not go by the books', cut corners, etc.
All this doesn't explain any of the direct actions of the PF of AF447.
It might however be related indirectly to a potentially sub- optimal workshare during the crisis and maybe even reluctance to openly express any discomfort with the actions of the colleague or different impressions of the actual situation. This would especially apply if the PF was the more experienced of the two F/O's.
Knowing who actually was PF could indicate if this might have been a factor or rather not.
Edit: As a hint that CRM seems to be a very important topic in this report: They have added Sub- Items to go more into the detail for that and used up most of the alphabet in doing so. The only other items where they also chose to go a bit into details was Instruction/Training and Flight Data Montitoring, albeit to a lesser extent.
Take that for what it's worth....