'wot Pace sed.
I did a lot of touring around the British Isles before I had any kind of instrument qualification. I quite routinely changed plan and diverted. It was just part of "the game" of flying VFR in British weather. Doubtless as an IMC rated pilot, I'll still do the same in the future, instrument training isn't the solution to all ills.
I also recall my PPL and subsequent licences teaching me how to recover from unusual attitudes.
I also recall many briefings over the years along the lines of "aviate, navigate, communicate" and messages about not losing control of the aeroplane in the hurry to communicate.
It also appears likely that there was adequate warning both visually and from the forecast of weather deteriorating below VMC.
So, it does appear that there were four bvious points to break the accident chain here, none of which were taken.
A few of other thoughts:
- Pulling the chute at 3,000ft immediately was a very early disregard of other means of recovery.
- 120 kts is hardly fast for a cirrus, so does not in itself imply a large pitching departure. 25deg nose-down and 66deg bank is a pretty average PPL training spiral dive.
- The AAIB inspector who wrote that report was clearly enjoying having so much data to play with.
- All of this reads as a pilot whose stress levels were escalating, spare capacity going down, and had failed to recognise and deal with these factors.
G