(Takata) I really think that it's pretty hard to conclude that he was doing something about this stall situation. First, the PF ignored deliberately the first warning and there is absolutely no mention of TOGA, neither thrust at this point but only a pitch-up, certainly inducing this initial climb. At the second stall warning, TOGA was applied but the pitch up was decupled. Hence the conclusion really lies elsewhere and I've got another bad feeling about what could have really happened.
I'm not entirely sure what your bad feeling is, but I agree, the simplest explanation of PF's continued Back Stick/nose up demand after reaching apogee is that the aircraft was going down, and the usual way to stop it is to ask for it to go up. There is no evidence that anyone realised the aircraft was stalled, not least because for a lot of the time there was no stall warning for the reasons supplied by the BEA. Whether the aircraft was recoverable in the end from the extreme AoA conditon is debatable. None of us, and I suspect not even Airbus knows what the pitching moments are at extreme angles, nor do we know whether in the end nose down stick with consequent eventual change in THS angle to airplane nose down/THS nose up actually makes things worse (both actions increase the THS incidence), though there are hints from the BEA that it doesn't.
If there are learning points from the accident, they won't be how to extricate oneself from 60 deg Aoa, but how to avoid getting there in the first place. I am still baffled by the cause of the initial pitch up. A month ago on the preceding thread I asked for a good explanation or a comment on my own hunch that it was a reaction to the initial decrease in indicated altitude after the start of the UAS event (due to the loss of appropriate Mach number correction). No one took me up on the challenge then, though HN39 took me to task for suggesting that the pull up was very robust, saying that even 0.2g would produce 7000 fpm in 18 secs; true, but 0.2 g is not exactly gentle controlling, it would normally only be exceeded by a TCAS RA (ideally 0.25g) or a GPW, and I don't believe I ever experienced such hamfisted inputs in my 35 years up front. So the question is still unanswered. It can't be the errant overspeed protection that caused the Turkish A340 skywards leap in 2000 because AF447 was not in normal law, Alt 2 doesn't offer overspeed protection (I understand), and anyway no one thinks the speed increased during the UAS event. So, suggestions pelase. Only by understanding what was going on in PF's mind from the beginning can we hope to prevent it happening again.