That's the way the AF447 pilots reacted; and it looks as if the PF did in fact manage to keep the aeroplane level and maintain airspeed for some 18 seconds;
According to the note more like 11 seconds. Anyway, is that supposed to be a good thing? Orville Wright managed 12 seconds on his first try...
What we DON'T know, of course, is what other instruments may have been misbehaving, in addition to the Air Speed Indicators.
At this point we have nothing indicating that they lost anything other than the airspeed derived data either.
Then came the (so far unexplained) zoom-climb, with no evidence of any sidestick input from the PF.
While I agree that we don't know how strong it was, it's somewhat hard to ignore the "left nose-up input" made just before the climb...
Finally, the stall warning sounded - and once again the PF appears to have 'gone by the book' as it applied at the time, carrying out the recommended procedure at the time - full Take- Off/Go Around power and try to maintain level flight.
Whatever book they were going by, I'd hazard a guess nose-up inputs resulting in 16 deg pitch attitude weren't in it.
At some point during this phase the "Trimmable Horizontal Stabiliser' (what used to be called the 'tailplane' in my day) went to 'full-up'; which would have made it just about impossible to maintain level flight.
It went up because the pilot wanted nose up (that that was probably for a good reason from his perspective is a different story, we will have to wait and see...).
For the record, the Alaska pilots had both to haul their columns back with all their strength just to maintain some sort of level flight, just from the 'down' THS attitude, even before the THS actually broke).
I'm not sure where you see the relevance of that incident, but as you note there the pilots fought with all their strength against the failed THS, which from what we know so far seems not to have been the case at all here...
That brings us to the main difference between modern airliners (particularly Airbus, though Boeing are moving in the same direction); that older aircraft types always left the pilot with the final word; whereas modern 'systems' are designed to overrule them if the systems 'conclude' that the pilots' actions are in some way endangering the airframe or doing other things that (in the opinion of the designers) are dangerous.
So, general anti FBW ranting aside, at which point do you suppose the FCS overrode the pilot's input, causing or contributing to the accident?