As I have said before, once the crew found themselves with an 'unknown' ?60? degrees AOA at the top of the 'zoom', they were well outside any training environment we could contemplate. In terms of instantaneous manoeuvre, they would have needed to pitch around 50-60 degrees nose down to unstall - who outside an aeros/mil pilot would dream of putting the nose down 40 or more below?
If we, as pilots, are to expect 'cradle to grave' protection (with limited understanding of how it works) from our systems they have to PREVENT this position in the first place. IE
the system should either prevent or warn of excessive AOA
prevent or warn of excessive THS movement
in terms of the Mk1 FMCS (the pilot), he/she MUST be allowed to see a reliable attitude indication at the outset AND trained to maintain the correct one - before things go pear-shaped. Once IAS reaches the very low levels 447 saw, pitch attitude has little meaning in terms of performance
We still do not know whether 447's 'zoom climb' was initiated by the system. The AAIB appear to say TC-JDN's probably was due to the system dropping itself into alpha-prot. In both cases, it is probable that had crew reaction to the pitch changes been more effective and quicker, we would not be in this long thread. HOWEVER - this assumes that crews are aware of the pitfalls of the systems, do not lose attitude info AND retain some basic flying skills - and, of course - are 'permitted' by the FCS to make the necessary control inputs.
I regret to say (yet again) that either the fbw sytems AND/OR the training need to change. I watch in a state of disbelief as all our 'experts' jostle backwards and forwards, page after page, over this flow diagram or this servo circuit or this latching/voting logic and wonder how mr/miss average Mk1 FMCS is going to cope with it all in a failure state - in the very limited time available - when even the computers do not know what has happened. The same goes for 'relaxed' stability in the drive for economy. If the a/c is too statically unstable to allow the 'average' to fly it without the fbw systems, this also needs to be reviewed.
Several of us have re-iterated that had the crew been able to and had flown basic pitch/power at the outset, this would not have happened. We need to focus on the why. We should, in the short-term, forget all the millivolts etc. Someone knows. It is probably on the CVR.