GarageYears
Look, the damn text from BEA states that pitch authority was STILL working well in the descent
BEA
Around fifteen seconds later, the PF made pitch-down inputs. In the following moments, the angle of attack decreased, the speeds became valid again and the stall warning sounded again
HeavyMetallist
There's ample evidence in reports linked to in the previous thread to support the facts reported so far by the BEA that nose-down pitch control would remain effective even when the mainplane/tailplane were stalled. Why some people persist in believing that stalled == totally ineffective is a mystery.
To say the truth, we dont know or at least nobody can know from the BEA stuff. I f BEA was sure at the moment of the statement that the reduction of the AOA and the validation of the speeds was a direct outcome of the former ND input, the wording could be clearer like
----Around fifteen seconds later, the PF made pitch-down inputs, the angle of attack decreased, the speeds became valid again and the stall warning sounded again.------- my wording
The wording " in the following moments" needs also to be noted as non standard expression to describe an event, which based on an preceeding one and was immidiately following. I see hesitation and time delay in this expression like saying ------- that was happening,, but we dontīt know yet how it is connected----. Why is no time mentioned, it would be available on the second.
The amount of reduction of angle of attack was not mentioned, but we know that it was not below 35°, as BEA stated that AOA never was better than 35AOA until impact. The triggering of the stall warning therefore has to be caused by the speed increase to above 60kts, if i remember the numbers correctly. But the speed was subjected to erroneous indications before, at the beginning ice (at least most of us agree on that) and later on due to disturbed airflow due to high AOA, yawing and banking and maybe even WX input. In the descent the ship might have entered the bad WX zone again, which could cause speed changes as well. AOA did decrease, BEA does not say how much, it might only have been some few degrees. It might have been caused by other movement of the aircraft, like rolling from much bank through the zero bank to the other side. There also AOA would decrease and later increase again.
And we have three pilots in the pointy end, who for sure contributed to the tragic outcome somehow, but wouldnīt they have made the conclusion that their ND input was successfull und therefore should have been maintained? They deliberately made ND input and reduced power out of TOGA, so we can assume that 3 pairs of eyes tried to see an improvement of the situation. Instead they gave up on it and tried something else? Why? Did they not recognize the AOA change and the increase in speed or did they not relate it to there former ND input? Maybe they discontinued their ND input and at that time the aircraft responded due to outside factors.
I dont know, i think it is to early and founded on meager information, on just one sentence with uncommon wording (or is that my language barrier) to say ND was effective and the crew just didnīt notice it.
Lots of options and possibilities, and sure, one of them is also that there was a ND input and it had an effect, which the crew did not recognize.