PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - Computers in the cockpit and the safety of aviation
Old 12th Jul 2011, 08:10
  #189 (permalink)  
BOAC
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
 
Join Date: Mar 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 18,579
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Overall, most here seem to be dancing around 'the head of my pin' even if sometimes in opposite directions.

I come back to post #1 - as long as there is going to be a 'human' in place in the cockpit we must ensure that when the 'perfect protection' fails - as it inevitably will - that the human is:-

1) Left with basic information to enable a reasonably rapid analysis of the situation and an equally rapid 'plan of action' to be formed

2) Equipped with the basic skills to execute the 'plan'

3) Given flight controls that will 'execute' his/her demands without interference

4) Have the opportunity (and training) to processs 1) without feeling (or being) 'pressured' into working through some complex electronic jungle of 'information/action' BEFORE it can be done.

Returning (I know!) to the trigger for this thread, 447, why could the whole shooting match not just be dropped? Autotrim into a stall - no - if PF finds not enough elevator authority, move the trim wheel. Voting out a series of confusing (to the computers, certainly) input conflictions - why not an earlier default to "Dave I don't really understand all this. Here is a basic aeroplane".

When it all goes 'south' we do not need any more 'bells and whistles'. The crew were not trying to land on another planet or achieve earth orbit docking with the ISS. They needed to stabilise, descend and turn out of the weather- a fairly basic (yes, challenging) flying task to the 'older generation'. They did not achieve this. Industry needs to address this, be it lack of training, the wrong training, the wrong 'automatics', the wrong 'mind-set' or whatever. Whatever it was, to find a crew apparently 'looking at' a high nose, high power and a huge rate of descent over several minutes and NOT working out that the AB-taught recovery is not working needs to be examined, and examined thoroughly, and not just written off as 'pilot error'. After all, how many times have my 'gums' beaten around the fact that a high r of d is one of the 'symptoms' of a stall, both on the blackboard and in the cockpit? Having the 'fact' that you cannot stall an aircraft drummed into you will probably suppress any sense of recognition that you just have.

I do not see progress here. I see 'defensive positions' at many points and an assault on the child who shouts about the King's clothes. Where does the responsibility lie? On another thread I was accused of "You have been busy ripping software engineers a new set of orifices it seems" what ever that bizarre fetish might be. I am not 'anti' the software. I am not 'anti' the writers. They will write, and write as well as humanly possible within their brief and any 'understanding' they might have of the flying 'task'. We have HR and accountants taking a lead role in how we train, practice and operate. The 'business' pressures are immense. Often 'blaming;' the crew is expedient. Is the 'long-stop' perhaps the test pilots? Is it amongst a 'stronger' training community? Are they able to say, 'hang on'? Where is the 'moderation/reality check' to be?
BOAC is offline