A couple of comments that call for a rejoinder.
The problem with the trim is that it moved to a high aircraft nose up setting without crew awareness.
Crew awareness of nose attitude begins, in instrument conditions, with the artificial horizon/attitude indicator. If that was working as advertised (no data to date suggests it was not) then the primay scan instrument should have given PF and PNF (and later Captain) indications of where the nose was relative to "level flight." Instrument Flying 101.
It appears that a FBW aircraft requires the pilot to know exactly what mode the aircraft is operating in or else the question arises, "What's it doing now?"
True of most modern aircraft (to include modern helicopters that aren't FBW, but do have a lot of redundant and overlapping flight control systems and related degraded modes)
Example is the SH-60 Seahawk:
From all things (and A/P such as it is) on (AFCS on) you go to AFCS off, then Trim Off, then SAS off (SAS 1 and / or SAS 2) then Boost off. You are still flying, but in each case you can do some things, and can't do others. The aircraft also gets a bit more "touchy" to handle, and pilot workload goes up. The last puzzle piece (which means you are having a very bad day) would be if your Boost was off and you then got a horizontal stab miscompare, which forces you into manual control of the stab. When working in fully functional mode, it is that aircraft's sole FBW control surface.
Graceful degradation? I guess so.
The Control Laws of A330 may or may not be as graceful in degradation, but the aircraft itself is a bit more complex, not the least due to the requirement to manage fuel and CG via various fuel transfer protocols.
Also there are more A/P functions and, more FBW involved. I have once again walked my way through the degraded modes. They make sense.
I guess that they make sense to A330 pilots, particularly if you get to practice them in suitable training environment. Nothing like some practice and a few "hell sessions" in a sim to get you to know your systems.
Regardless of which bird you fly, you really have to know your systems.
The more systems, and the more they interact, the more you have to know. Enter your company, and the manufacturer, and their training material, and the training programs.
Those last are critical elements in how well any crew understands their aircraft.
In the case of the AF447 crew, they had no attention to spare to consider what the trim might be doing, thus the nose up demands caused the trim to run silently to a high setting without the knowledge or anticipation of the crew.
Crew awareness of nose attitude begins, in instrument conditions, with the artificial horizon/attitude indicator. If that was working as advertised (no data to date suggests it was not) then the primay scan instrument should have given PF and PNF (and later Captain) indications of where the nose was. Instrument Flying 101.
jcjeant:
So Air France bear all the responsibility for this accident by not providing adequate training to their pilots or not detecting by exams (simulator) that those pilots were not qualified for fly a Airbus A330
All? Outside of the cockpit, there are three non trivial and overlapping bodies who influence how well prepared a crew is for their missions.
The airline
The aircraft manufacturer
Regulating bodies
The rule sets and information each of these bodies issues to guide, restrict, limit or otherwise influence expected pilot behavior is subject to omission or error. AF has a share of responsibility, but for you to say "all" is an overstatement.
At least and even if this above is not entirely true .. Air France stay bear the responsibility of this accident as the contract between Air France and their passengers was to transport them from A to B and they failed.... Are my feelings good
I suppose that from a "strict liability" point of view, that's one way to look at the accident: breach of contract to carry from point A to point B.
Looking at it that way doesn't get one any closer to addressing the sysetmic issues that are under the conginzance of
The airline
The aircraft manufacturer
Regulating bodies
Therein lies the remedy to avoiding such a mishap in the future.