takata: your tone is unappreciated. I am trying to be cordial here. You might notice that I used the
smile to indicate humor in the Brenner Pass jest. You respond with snotty sarcasm.
"Tunnel vision" is a particular kind of congnitive problem to overcome in a cockpit. (Also known as target fixation in tactical jets, and a non trivial factor in numerous CFIT mishaps). I find it an utterly unsatisfactory diagnosis for the crew's performance in AF447.
Please go back to the post you have chosen to respond to with such sarcasm, and note my edit for clarity. Compound emergencies versus malfunctions: what are you trained to do, and how are you trained?
LATER EDIT: you may not realize that we are in violent agreement.
The fact is that the STALL warnings was already identified as the main factor of early confusion during an UAS event BEFORE AF447 case. It was where the procedure seemed already weak (some concern about it was discussed with Airbus) as it was also the first information displayed before the UAS issue was identified, then it was potentially known as dangerous.
I ask you in all seriousness, again, how do you, takata, train people to do tasks? Do you? The point is to connect to your own personal experience, not to talk down to you.
Your pretense that all that is needed to address is previous UAS incidents is at odds with the problem set confronting the crew, and the non-trivial problem to how the crew reacted to stall warning, at altitude. (As noted earlier, whether they should have needed to respond to stall warning is a good question, but once you are presented with stall warning, what do you do?)
mm43 makes an important point about timing, descent rate, and the chances of recovery (via nose lowering and subsequent pull out once the wing is unstalled) that points to the odds of recovery as _low_ once the high AoA, stalled descent had become a more or less stable flight condition.
For my money, he's very close to the mark.
This makes response to the initial stall warning a critical action in the chain of events. Response to stall warning ... trained response ... NOT tunnel vision.
Yet again, the difference between dealing with a
malfunction versus dealing with an
emergency, or approach to an emergency, and multiple malfunctions at once.
Back to the Swiss Cheese. (Hence the Brenner Pass, more humor). Even with the admonitions from the Pitch and Power Chorus, even with PJ2's well reasoned point that patient, gentle, response to UAS and Alt law flying at altitude, there are still cheese slices to pull out of the stack in how one responds to both malfunctions and more serious inflight problems: stall, or approach to a stall. Again, as I point out, and others more experienced than me have as well, this points to a training issue.
Stall response, and stall training response is linked to the AoA display question.
The industry generally (not just Airbus) chooses not to add AoA gages into airliner cockpits. Sound arguments for and against can be made. One should not be surprised that many pilots would prefer that a flying parameter, AoA, is available on the display, but simply adding a gauge isn't enough.
How do you train? (This question is not now directed at you, takata, but perhaps better said as "how does an organization train its people?" )
How do you habitually incorporate an AoA gauge into your scan? The answer to that question would be a component of the answer in whether or not AoA display is a chosen feature.
If the aircraft monitors the AoA for you (which most passenger planes seem to do), AoA going absent for a while leaves you blind. You can look all you want, and the information you seek isn't there.
This goes back to a question which may never be answered: what did the PF see? What did the nose pitch attitude tell him? The BEA is pretty clear about where the nose was, and how long it stayed there. The largest flight instrument in the cockpit is usually the artificial horizon (attitude indicator) on the PFD. A330 cockpit layout looks to be no exception.