With respect, takata, I don't think you understood what I was talking about.
It would be useful to consider what
the reaction to stall warning training is and how it is done. (Or was). Some pages back, a very useful description of the 2005 vintage of that procedure was linked to.
The condition/response set isn't the same issue to address as "reaction to UAS training," which is a malfunction of a lesser order.
EDIT for clarity: what the crew was confronted with is the classic training challenge of dealing with cascading and / or compound malfunctions/emergencies. (Note: some will argue that the more dire may have been a crew induced, but that doesn't change what problems they were faced with solving).
Here's your situation, handle it like a good crew should, oh, and here's another on top of that, off you go ... In situations like that, how you train has substantial influence on how you act (and don't act) in the air.
Perhaps best to leave the
tunnel analysis in the Alps, near the Brenner Pass.
