A/P is "required" by SOP via Airbus, not in some mechanical requirement. Leaving the controls alone is not unwise in turbulence, where "maintaining" trumps "maneuvering" yes?
There is one other interface in the mix that gets little attention, that being auto v. mechanical?
The Sidestick would seem to be an attempt at "feel" retention. As such, perhaps jcjeant's touchscreen would be a more honest approach? The THS is powered by a jackscrew via hydraulic pressure, not the speediest method of response. Trim implies "relief", not control.
TRIM accomplishes a stability in pressure, independent of deflection. This is a valuable resource when "maneuvering", for it communicates the a/c demands and wishes to the flyer. Does the FCS have need of this "feel"?
Such a valuable resource to eliminate from the endeavor! As to certification, why would a THS be required to plant at max deflection and stay there whilst a recovery is attempted? And if not required for certification, the a/c must be recoverable with elevators only, I would think. So why is the HS even allowed such an excursion?
This thread is generally peopled by those who would grant the system a pass on criticism in the LOC/event arena. Yet the pilots are referred to as "Why in the World...?"
Either the PF knew not the position of the THS, or he disregarded it.
Again, the answer, for me anyway is to be found in the seconds leading to a/p disconnect, and those few that elapsed at the initial climb.
The PF completely ignored the TRIM WHEEL? He commanded a ridiculous climb at low energy? He held backstick seven miles down into the SEA?
Absolutely not. From the outset, BEA has been manipulating public opinion re: this accident in the worst of ways, impugning the pilots, to include those who were open to continued UAS events. Does anyone doubt the motive behind the "Note"? Airbus got, and then sent, the message, n'est-ce pas?
bear, It is impossible to slander without abusing the TRUTH.