jcjeant, I HAVE read it fully...........
I was particularly struck by its mention of the THS misbehaviour - which contains almost the same words as the more recent AF 447 report:-
Between 15 h 44 min 30 and 15 h 45 min 05, the stabiliser moved from -4.4° to -11.2° corresponding to the electric pitch-up stop. It stayed in this position until the end of the recording.
If there is anything else in the report that explains
why the THS did this, other than the passage I quoted (which refers to an 'automatic compensation system') I must have missed it? Please point me to the passage you mean?
The strong implication of the BEA's Note is that the AF 447 pilot's noseup inputs caused the THS to go 'full up' and stay there for good; even though, in the latter part of the descent, he was applying nosedown inputs. But equally, the THS at Perpignan did exactly the same thing (went full up) even though the pilot in that case was applying only nosedown inputs.
Which strongly suggests that the THS was, for some reason, 'acting on its own account' rather than reacting to the sidestick inputs?
Anyway, as requested, please 'point me' towards the explanations you reckon are contained in the Perpignan report?