Hello Bearfoil;
Understand what you mean but there is no indication in the BEA Update that the aircraft was not in stable flight, likely level, not climbing or descending. The QRH drill and checklist are clear. The meaning of "stability" in this context has to do with steady-state power settings and a level pitch attitude as required by the QRH checklist. Certainly there are going to be pitch variations around a "nodal point" in turbulence but the power isn't going to change once the AT is disconnected.
An autopilot disconnecting in cruise is not a big deal but one certainly, immediately, looks for the cause. I recall from discussion with people who knew the airplane well (when learning the airplane in 1999) that the EFCS is "way ahead" of all systems - and responds much faster than the pilot can to changes or system problems. That it took ten seconds or so between the AP disconnect and the annunciation of the pitot problem may be due to the extensive BITE test processes which ensure the accuracy of the fault, (correlation) and both communication (SDAC > FIDS > FWC1 > FWC2 > CMC, CMS & DMCs). Lack of correlation will cause a WRG fault to be included in the fault message. During that time we do not know what either crew member saw on his PFD in terms of failing AS. We cannot know what the #2 PFD displayed but I have argued elsewhere that it was about the same as the other two; no pilot would try to control high speed with such a pitch-up. The power would be brought back first, then possibly speedbrakes used. We will know soon enough.
Regardless, a loss of airspeed information is no time for swift action, especially in weather. It is time for deliberate, measured action that is slowed down and closely coordinated with the PNF, (announcement by the PF of the drill or checklist, PNF's participation in the checklist or memory item and/or concurrence if a change in flight path/direction is indicated, completion of the challenge-response checklist, securing the aircraft after the abnormal is over, communicating with ATC, Company, F/As).
It is no time for individual action which leaves the other crew member unaware of the course of action and therefore unable to assist. We do not know what occurred during this period except that which the BEA Update includes. Again, we will know soon enough.
The failure to log onto DAKAR still bothers me. In itself it is no big deal providing communications are established on HF (which they were) but they needed a clearance to deviate off-course and didn't get it. CPDLC makes such clearances easily and quickly obtainable. It didn't seem to be an emergency diversion around a build-up they didn't see. Anyway...another item for the BEA to think about.