Is there any indication if the PF (and PNF) understood the cause of the Law change was the simultaneous failure of AS sensors? (considered as of negligible probability in the a/c System design) I.e. they realized that (if) the start of the events were caused by "just" the "icing limitation" of the (inadequate) AS sensors? Or also they never understood the reason of AP/AT disengagement and subsequent "steps"?
When the autopilot and autothrust disconnect in cruise, one takes over and manually flies the aircraft. With no speed information, the last thing one should do is change anything...pitch or power. The airplane was stable just before the loss of airspeed data.
While there are indications on the PFD that the aircraft is in Alternate Law, they don't need to know what law the aircraft is in to take over and fly manually, and they don't need to know the reasons for the speed failure. They must fly the airplane, period, with tiny, steady inputs, and wait...and get the QRH out for pitch and power settings while selecting the GPS page on the MCDUs, to watch altitude and groundspeed. That's a short-term solution, while they settle down and maintain control. No computers are going to prevent that.
The notion may have been proposed but it has not been demonstrated that either "automation" or "the computers" were preventing them from doing just that.
For emphasis, the absolute first thing to do is stabilize the aircraft and keep it there. Stabilizing the airplane may even mean doing nothing except ensuring that the pitch and power stay the same. Then one watches the trend
very carefully to see if slight adjustments are required.
I cannot emphasize enough that this is not an emergency but an abnormality which has a specific and straightforward response, (which was executed in all other UAS events).
Examining computer behaviour through detailed parameters in this case, is, I think, going to be all after the fact, that they had nothing to do with the pitch-up. Further, if the initial causes of this accident actually lie in the electrons and decision gates, we're all doomed because compiling software or building chips without mistakes is something no one doing that work can or will claim as possible.
That does not mean that confusion about the aircraft's situation is improbable. I think it is quite possible and very probable, and the sources of are long before and well beyond the cockpit.
What we should expect is that the computers do not prevent the pilot from doing his or her job. I know of no case in transport flying where the computers prevented the pilot from flying the airplane and doing what he or she needed to do to maintain control and prevent an accident.