oldchina quoting Roseland
It is unknown whether the decision not to detour further away was due in part to a fuel constraint".
Well, unknown to you and I certainly, but I bet the answer comes out on the CVR, and is known to the BEA.
Must admit, oldchina, that aspect bugs me more than any other part of tihs business. Unless we are expected to believe that the two duty pilots said nothing between
'We've lost the speeds' and
'no indications' -and, further, that the captain said nothing at ALL during his two minutes on the flight deck - it seems obvious that the BEA is suppressing (or, one could say, concealing) information that would probably go a long way towards identifying the primary cause(s) of the accident.
In this connection, it's possibly relevant to quote some passages from the report and CVR transcript for the A320, flown by XL Airways pilots, that crashed off Perpignan in 2008. Those pilots definitely acted unwisely, to say the least - they decided to test the 'low speed protections' at only 3,000 feet, in landing configuration - but the report and transcript clearly shows that, as in the case of AF 447, the THS went to 'full up' and stayed there - and the pilots were just plain unable to get the nose down:-
When the stall warning sounded, the Captain reacted by placing the thrust levers in the TO/GA detent and by pitching the aeroplane down, in accordance with procedures. The nose-down input was not however sufficient for the automatic compensation system to vary the position of the horizontal stabilizer, which had been progressively deflected to the pitch-up stop by this system during the deceleration. The Captain controlled a left roll movement, caused by the stall. The aeroplane’s high angle of attack and the roll movements generated asymmetry, and a speed variation between ADR 1 and 2 appeared. This increasing divergence caused a rejection of the three ADRs by the FAC then the ELAC. The flight control system then passed into direct law. It is likely that the crew did not notice this due to the emergency situation and the aural stall warning that covered the warning of a change of flight control laws. The Air New Zealand pilot, by saying “alpha floor, we’re in manual” likely considered that the alpha floor function had triggered and that in fact the autopilot had disconnected.
15 h 44 min 46 Okay here we go
15 h 44 min 49 Und ich sag ihr jetzt dass wir im Moment in Dreitausend bleiben
The weight is fifty four
And I say now to her that we are maintaining three thousand at the moment
15 h 44 min 51 Golf X-ray Lima triple eight
Tango can you speed reduce speed again
15 h 44 min 56 We are reducing
15 h 44 min 57 Triple click
15 h 44 min 58 ��We are still reducing the speed Golf X-ray Lima triple eight Tango (*)
15 h 45 min 03 (*) I will say when the trim stops
The word “stops” is stronger than the rest of the phrase
15 h 45 min 05 SV: Stall ( x13)
Cricket (stall warning)
15 h 45 min 06 Stop ! Noise similar to thrust levers being moved forward to the stop
15 h 45 min 13 (oh oh oh)
15 h 45 min 18 (…)
15 h 45 min 19 End of stall warning
15 h 45 min 20 Single chime
15 h 45 min 24 Ich nehm die Speed noch mal hoch ja?
(I increase speed ) Yeah?
15 h 45 min 26 Ja it's pitching up all the time
15 h 45 min 27 (…) Stick forward (*)
15 h 45 min 29 Pitching up
15 h 45 min 30
15 h 45 min 31 It’s (*) alpha floor we’re in manual Single chime
15 h 45 min 33 It's pitching up this (…)
15 h 45 min 34 Kriegst du das geregelt? Are you able to handle this?
15 h 45 min 35 Nee No
15 h 45 min 36 Gear up SV: Stall (12 times)
15 h 45 min 37 Gear up Cricket (stall warning)
15 h 45 min 39 Gear up Gear up
15 h 45 min 40 (*)
15 h 45 min 42 (…)
15 h 45 min 44 (…)
15 h 45 min 45
15 h 45 min 47
You can read the whole report on here if you like:-
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2008/d-la...a081127.en.pdf
Sorry for the long quote - but I thought about cutting out 'irrelevant parts' but finally concluded that just about ALL of it is possibly relevant.
One question for Airbus pilots. We all know that Airbus throttles don't have servos - so they just stay in their detents, they don't move in response to thrust changes by the autothrust. Are there servos on the trimwheels - or do they also just remain in the 'normal position' whatever the systems tell the THS actually to do?
And, if the latter is so, what means do the pilots have of finding out what position the THS is actually in at any given time?