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Old 4th Jul 2011, 06:43
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RR_NDB
 
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Sorry RR_NDB but I'm not understanding what your saying.

My objective now is to clarify to allow a perfect understanding of what i said (briefly in a short text). As i told you i will elaborate later.

I will start from your last phrase, a question:

So....is it your thesis that, "manufacturer's making it difficult for investigators by controlling all the parameters on the FDR so we only get to see what they want us to see"?
Not! absolutely NOT!

If you're advancing some kind of notion that this is all a conspiracy...
Not! absolutely NOT!

Also, what makes you say that an investigation is, "dependent upon the plane manufacturer for some complex details during the investigation analysis." What does that mean? What are you trying to say? What, specifically, are these "complex details" to which you refer? What do you mean by "advanced planes"?
I suspect a Safety Board could not be able to analyze some details (e.g. glitches) that may occur (and perhaps occurred) in this case. Svarin raised and elaborated on that. We may never be able to understand what happened because the required information could vanished (like the AS not measured). The complexity (State of the Art machines) of the Airbus SAS "advanced planes" may suggest a future rethink of the FDR concept. Why? Because when Airbus SAS advanced planes introduced FBW plus a new "control" philosophy (Laws, protections, etc.) put another "crew member" in the cockpit" and itīs behavior has to be fully analyzed (and understood) in an accident. This "complex crew member" was "flying" the a/c before AP/AT disengagement. And was also flying after (THS moved). And this "crew member" is "made" of Hardware, Software, internal links (subject to WRG failures, etc.) and is naturally subject to do unpredictable things. Despite itīs State of the Art characteristics. (Redundant, etc.) We can remember the (extreme) Reaganīs SDI Testability issue. And IIRC was you that posted an excellent text on "possible" and "probable" things.

You claim a connection with "Mooreīs Law", but you don't explain the connection and just leave your readers guessing. I looked it up using your link. There's no connection to AF 447 or flight data work whatsoever.
The growing complexity of the "on board Systems" makes me remember the "Mooreī s Law" (named after Intel co-founder Gordon E. Moore, who described the trend in his 1965 paper.) I just made an analogy to the "prophecy", Intel Guruīs made that i observed closely all these years since i designed my first computer in 1975 using the first microprocessor, the Intel 4004 using itīs chipset. You may observe i put in the end of my phrase: to say you i was commenting with a "nerdīs humour". And the growing complexity concerns me. Why? Because i worked in complex Electronic Systems Design (in Test and Measurement area) dealing with Testability, Diagnosability and System Testing, Module Testing and Components Testing. In AF447 analysis we never will know the actual AS during certain moments, simply because this info. was not measured. And this occurred not by Pitot failure. As jcjeant told you. Other(s) System failure(s) (with the PF inside the loop) may never be possible to understand. Why? Because the mentioned "internal mechanisms" were not recorded. Complexity brings fantastic features, at a price. Observe iīm not saying what (if) occurred. We actually know very little. My objective now, as you well said, is to understand the "persistent pitch up". And iīm just remembering the complexity of the required analysis to allow a full understanding of a complex System like the ones being gradually put in the entire Aviation Industry with the leadership of Airbus SAS (paying the toll on the pioneers)

What do you mean by "internal mechanisms"? I've never heard of the term in accident investigation or flight data analysis work.
The current FDR concept deals with this "crew member" considering it as an Engineering black box. This point, as i told before, i will elaborate later.

(must awake early for a monday with some CBīs ahead I tried here to do my best to clarify, preparing what i will present later on the issue.

Finally i must mention the title of my post: Why the "pitch up"

The motivation to write "briefly in a short text" was only related to the most important (before July end) as you emphasized perfectly.

I am entirely open to further clarify to you or (anyone) any point before going deeper into the "probable need for more data" to fully "understand" the behavior of the "complex crew member" in an investigation of accidents involving "advanced planes"
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