RR_NDB:
"Redundancy is "powerful" when critical elements do not fail simultaneously. And UAS cases show clearly simultaneous "failing" (due product limitation) Simultaneous "failure" of critical elements should be reported immediately.
To the crew, and in Real Time.
RT? Why not make the demand: PREDICTIVE!
I already mentioned before and is repeated by others:
They (FCPCs) know when the speed is missing, they don't know the probes iced up. That will be the task for CMC to correlate warning with failure.
How critical is a Pitot probe icing? not a red alert - immediate action required - in view of the A/C industry in general.
UAS caused by Pitot Icing = Transient.
"Whenever unreliable airspeed indication is suspected and aircraft attitudeand thrust are not consistent with the flight phase, initially disregard all speed indications and use pitch attitude and thrust setting as primary flight references." Like NW did and the other incidents.......
Note: the statement above is NOT from airbus.
Question to all.
Considering the ECAM messages, after clearing the A/P disconnect the first CREW action will be:
-THR LEVERS……..MOVE
@RR_NDB: presented In RT (repeat interval 5 sec., must be important)
Timestamped 02:10:06
They know from heart T/L need to be moved towards 'frozen' N1.
45 sec. passed.
BEA states: 02:10:51 ....The thrust levers were positioned in the TO/GA detent and.....
In what postion was it in between? What is the expected cruise N1 with data just before the event at 2::10:04?