Hi,
poorjohn
We have only two things going for us when we encounter a new situation
20 years ago i had an incident at night under rain conditions (with no consequences) and made very deep analysis starting next day at 8 AM.
This car had an abnormal position of CG (too ahead) much different to my rear engine car used by me during 500,000 miles +. I had only 1 second (or less) to understand what was going on after i initiated a "test maneuver" to check an abnormal behavior the car showed some 30 minutes before during a 2 hour short trip.
In analyzing the incident (with a friend, air accidents investigator, C130, 707, etc. Captain) i concluded (modeled) we have in our mind "two processors"
1. One "processor", that check if the "scenario" you are facing fits in what you stored in your memory up to this day. Itīs put "on line" immediately and first.
2. Another processor that "try" to understand the new situation that seems to be very different from everything you saw before. Both "processors" operate concurrently.
Human beings, has this second capability. Machines has just the first one (they were programmed to deal with a finite number of possible scenarios)
During the "decisive phase" along the incident i had in about 1 second opportunity to select and implement the best solution for a situation i never before imagined as possible to occur. And despite therefore, not being able to find a similar scenario in my "data base".
And during the "high adrenalin" phase i had time to think a lot of things including the surprise with the new intriguing scenario.
I see the pilot as the only one capable to solve new scenarios not imagined by the System designers. And this always will be for an airliner.
To do that he must receive immediately all the BASIC information from a SIMPLE interface. This can be, IMHO the "turning point" when unexpected situations arise.
And if the System for any reason delays his perception, or even worse, present and introduce "new components" the pilot chances reduces accordingly, to timely perform the best and precise actions.
In the described case i was able, despite facing a very rare and highly improbable failure, to feel very fast (in less than one second), the car behavior in order to act decisively and precisely to save my life. In an advanced plane, full of complex "feedback Systems" affected by crew actions "in the loop" the issue is really complex. But it seems to me to be mandatory to allow an immediate understanding of whatīs happening, obviously with the help of the System.