BOAC
As I have said before, all that needs to be achieved by a crew in the 447 situation would be
1) stabilise the a/c at 'onset' level
2) Achieve a safe descent (or climb - if that is what is needed)
3) Make a successful diversion/return
Itīs the old basic airmanship when running into non standard situations:
1. Maintain aircraft control
2. Analyze the situation
3. Take proper action
Now let me look in some detail at those points and let me ask some questions to those three points for discussion.
1. Maintain aircraft control
Must this point change to "take aircraft control"? Isnīt it HAL controlling the aircraft and the Crew only monitoring / observing? Is all the information available to gain or maintain control? Is the presentation of information for a high level of situational awareness optimized for a fully operational aircraft and does it also show the degradation of systems with emphasis to the overall aim "maintain aircraft control"? Is the present training for emergency situations focused on "worst case situation" (where you have to handfly in degraded modes while dealing with other non normal problems) or is it mostly relying on HAL doing the flying while dealing with problems? To maintain aircraft control the crew must fully understand the present state, the aircraft is in (FBW mode, systems availability, aerodynamic capability, energy state, degraded systems, .....). Is all this information not only available, but also present in the sense of "does the crew know"?
2. Analyze the situation
If not finished with Nr. 1, this point will start with a limbing leg even with perfect CRM. If the crew is not aware of the state of the aircraft like described in point one when forced to take and maintain control, the "analyze" will be a parallel and interfering action to point 1.
Is the information presented in a way, that the crew can distinguish between priority items like "A" (immidiate action needed) "B" (attention and later action needed), "C" (Nice to know, do it later)? Is the information presented consistent enough till it is no problem any more or is it volatile due to other following problems, or self solutions by the system (What is it doing now?)?
Let me tell an example from my flying live.
We had no ECAM, but a panel with warning lights (red, yellow and green for above mentioned A,B,C items). The panel was structured according some vital systems (engine, flight controls, fuel, environmental, nav, gear and brakes) and the lights where labeled accordingly. Once a red or yellow light was triggered, it triggered a master caution light. One view to the light panel gave you information what system was affected (location on the panel), wether it was Item A or B, and the specic failure of the system. Additional following or parallel system malfunctions triggered aditional lights and would trigger Master caution again (once on, it was resetted to off by a punch on the light), but the former indicated failures kept to be present. It was a one view information system, in my view simple and effective with no need to scroll through pages of letters, sentences and numbers.
3. Take proper action
If point 1 and point 2 from above are successfully accomplished, that should pose no real problem to an aircrew.
Just my view