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Old 30th Jun 2011, 18:08
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CONF iture
 
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Originally Posted by PJ2
I will not say that the checklist is without its problems. It has been modified a number of times since its appearance in ~2002. I have said before and will say it again here: The UAS drill and memory items are confusing and that is a "support" factor, ('support' meaning well-written drills, checklists and procedures), which may even be relevant to this accident.
This paragraph is a key point in your last few posts.
And sadly, the way the UAS procedure is written is a true reflect on how neglected that procedure has been dealt by Airbus for a situation at cruising altitude.

As a matter of fact, pre AF447, how many times have we trained for UAS at cruising altitude ?
In my own experience ... never !

Following the Air Caraibes incidents, there was an apparent willingness to address the issue – That was in October 2008 – 7 months before AF447.



2 years after AF447A suivre … did not yet materialize.

Your concept Do nothing is mainly correct but is certainly not suggested by the UAS procedure the way it is still written up to now.
The way you detail it, is, IMO, mainly your own interpretation, and not supported by the text. It is not clear what is part of the memory items, what is not, what leads to what ... ?

As a starting point, what does mean If the safe conduct of the flight is impacted ?
In my book, the safe conduct of a flight is always impacted, from start to end.

And if the procedure has to be divided in two different course of action, as a start, it should be clearly mentioned to relieve any ambiguity :
  • If the safe conduct of the flight is impacted …
  • If the safe conduct of the flight is not impacted …
Where is such unambiguous bifurcation point ?
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