TM, I interpreted ‘the fine words’ as to be directed at management; someone who can restrict the operational situations which pilots might face.
With your example (737 RTO), the generic risky situation evolved from relatively recent RTO training materials which introduced ‘if unable to fly’.
This text requires an evaluation, whereas an engine failure is a simple ‘if-then’ assessment (If engine fails below V1, Then stop).
The speed trend is a poorly described artefact of technology which has be put to good use in some situations (IMHO it’s a crutch for an inferior speed display, but that’s another matter).
The decision to add speed / trend anomalies or similar in an RTO decision increase operational complexity, such situations must be bounded. What is anomalous, how much change from the norm, what difference can be tolerated, when, why.
The availability of technology (speed trend) introduces the opportunity for complexity, but its humans who control the level of complexity; e.g. with specific guidance in a procedure – "If ASI fail or error (<= 5 kt split) below 80 kts, Then stop; trend vector N/A. Above 80kts go, use the standby and resolve any ambiguity at a safe altitude".
The guidance / procedure controls the circumstance of the situation; this should be based on a risk assessment – technical probabilities, e.g. is the trend vector an essential item, if not then ignore; cf dual vs single ASI failure during take off – bound the situation with an error margin and total speed.
In an RTO scenario, controlling the context / circumstance of the situation and thus opportunity for dilemma*, well formed operational guidance should maintain safety even with high tech systems.
* I use ‘dilemma’ opposed to error in this instance, as the decision would likely be ‘correct’ for the situation at the time, based on what was perceived and judged against the crew’s belief – vague / incomplete guidance, and common (perhaps mistaken) knowledge and training about a facet of new technology.