EGMA
I think it worth remembering the difference between recovering from an incipient stall and a developed stall.
I think you're exactly right there, EGMA. Basically pilots appear, until recently anyway, to have been advised and trained only on 'stall avoidance,' not specifically on 'stall recovery;' and also, apparently, to give at least equal priority to 'maintaining altitude,' rather than concentrating on getting the nose down.
The only 'good news,' though, according to this article covering a meeting that took place this year, is that both main manufacturers, and presumably the airlines too, appear finally to be well aware of the need for a 'rethink':-
"Recent crashes linked to stalls include that of the Colgan Air Bombardier Q400 on approach to Buffalo, N.Y. (2009); Turkish Airlines Boeing 737-800 in short final for Amsterdam (2009); West Caribbean Airways MD-82 in Venezuela (2005); Thomsonfly Boeing 737-300 near Bournemouth, England (2007); and XL Airways Germany Airbus A320 off the coast of Perpignan, France (2009).
“Most approach-to-stall incidents and accidents occur with sufficient altitude available for the recovery,” Boeing Senior Safety Pilot Mike Coker told delegates at the Flight Safety Foundation’s European Aviation Safety Seminar in Istanbul this year. “Incidents progress to accidents when the crew fails to make a positive recovery after the stall warning occurs.”
"Flawed training is partly to blame, he asserts. Approach-to-stall training is typically conducted at simulated altitudes of 5,000-10,000 ft., but many stalls actually happen much higher. In the case of AF447, stalls occurred at 35,000 ft. and 38, 000 ft., respectively. That has important, negative implications, Coker concludes.
“Recovery stresses an increase to maximum thrust and recovery with minimal altitude loss,” he says. Therefore, “students try to minimize the nose-down pitch change while engines spool up.”
"To make matters worse, engine margins at high altitude are much smaller than at lower flight levels, where pilots can count on a much greater response to power increases. Also, Coker says, “it is probable when pilots remain on a particular model for extended periods of time that their exposure to approach-to-stall indications and recovery occur as infrequently as once in a decade,” when stall exercises should really be part of recurring training. He stresses that training should focus on correct procedures, reducing the angle of attack and appropriate energy awareness, and not so much on minimizing altitude loss.
"Airbus and Boeing have worked together to devise new procedures for stall recovery that emphasize angle of attack rather than preserving altitude."
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/jsp_includes/articlePrint.jsp?headLine=null&storyID=news/awst/2011/06/06/AW_06_06_2011_p36-330706.xml
I think that tends to confirm my earlier speculation that the blame for this accident is likely eventually to be spread four, or possibly five, ways - in no particular order, the manufacturer (extensive instrument shutdowns, plus the currently-inexplicable behaviour of the THS), the airline (inadequate training and undue emphasis on 'conserving altitude'), the pitot-tube supplier (given that low speed indications may have triggered the stall warnings even though true airspeed may still have been adequate), the pilots, and the weather.
The only 'good news' is that the industry as a whole seems already to be reacting to the 'lessons' of AF447 and other similar accidents, not just waiting for the BEA to produce its report.