Macinbird wrote:
Part of the AF447 crew problem that night must have been stall recognition. The flying qualities in the stall were too much like normal flight. Should that be a certification issue?
Incorrect statement, the aircraft was nose high, low airspeed far below minimum for the configuration, weight and airmass instability, sinking like a rock.
What about the "stall stall stall" warning you say? Unfortunately that occurred in a context where its validity was called into question. That is why AOA indicators could have helped.
Needs no complex evaluation to determine flight condition and corrective actions. AOA indicator would confirm it, and the stall warning is obvious.
Did you use your AOA as you flew, or did you consider it redundant?
When the airspeed packs up and anytime you are flying slowly, it can tell you quite a lot about your aircraft's performance potential.
Were your airmanship and flying skills as good at 0200 in the morning as they were at 1000 in the morning? If you had been in one of the front office seats in AF447 when the airspeed went South, are you certain it would have been a non-event for you?
I am not the typical airline type. As chief experimental pilot with decades experience, who determines the authorized flight envelope by flying out of it (for example, to determine VMO [maximum operating airspeed] we fly at 125% its value), and writes pilot manuals and procedures including stall recovery.
In my operational flying, I am better at 2 am, because I know the associated problems and make proper advance preparations. I never use any questionable chemical substance, not even anti-perspirants which poison your body with aluminum, but instead deodorants which lack it (most readers don't know that).