Opherben-:
"....a fliable aircraft, even when lacking an instrument or two, when CFIT from 38,000 feet, is the result of pilot performance. Not to mention how he got there. Or the full aft sidestick input held throughout the fall. Additionally, one doesn't have to be an experienced captain, just a rated aviator, to know how to avoid a CB, and how to trim to neutral during stall recovery. Altough engine thrust when initially applied here is counterproductive, it shouldn't affect recovery by much as a full forward SS plus neutral trim would have effected a successful recovery by FL200."
As someone who only ever flew gliders and light singles, it's probably presumptuous of me to comment, Opherben. But, to my mind, that raises the immediate question of how any of us know that the aeroplane was 'flyable' at all - particularly given the 'full up' position of the 'trimmable horizontal stabiliser' (better known, in my flying days, as the 'tailplane'?
To quote the BEA report on an earlier (2008) all-killed accident in an A320 off Perpignan:-
When the stall warning sounded, the Captain reacted by placing the thrust levers
in the TO/GA detent and by pitching the aeroplane down, in accordance with
procedures.
The nose-down input was not however sufficient for the automatic compensation
system to vary the position of the horizontal stabilizer, which had been progressively
deflected to the pitch-up stop by this system during the deceleration.
Further on in the 2008 Perpignan report, the BEA states:-
Between 15 h 44 min 30 and 15 h 45 min 05, the stabiliser moved from -4.4° to -11.2°
corresponding to the electric pitch-up stop. It stayed in this position until the end
of the recording.
The aeroplane attitude increased sharply and its speed dropped to the point
that rendered it practically uncontrollable, the flight control surfaces becoming
ineffective due to the low speed and the high angle of attack. The aeroplane
stalled again, this time irrecoverably, bearing in mind the aeroplane’s altitudeand without any crew inputs on the trim wheel and the thrust levers. The loss of control was thus caused by a thrust increase performed with afull pitch-up horizontal stabilizer position. This position and the engine
thrust made pitch down control impossible.
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2008/d-la...a081127.en.pdf
In the case of AF447, the BEA's phrasing seems to be almost eerily similar:-
At 2 h 10 min 51 , the stall warning was triggered again. The thrust levers were positioned in the TO/GA detent and the PF maintained nose-up inputs. The recorded angle of attack, of around 6 degrees at the triggering of the stall warning, continued to increase. The trimmable horizontal stabilizer (THS) passed from 3 to 13 degrees nose-up in about 1 minute and remained in the latter position until the end of the flight.
One more thing to add - a final quote from the BEA 'note' on AF447; that, at a bit over 10,000 feet, the PF (possibly acting on the orders of the captain, who, according to that Der Spiegel leak, correctly diagnosed that the problem was a stall):-
At 2 h 12 min 02, the PF said "I don’t have any more indications", and the PNF said "we have no valid indications". At that moment, the thrust levers were in the IDLE detent and the engines’ N1’s were at 55%. Around fifteen seconds later, the PF made pitch-down inputs. In the following moments, the angle of attack decreased, the speeds became valid again and the stall warning sounded again.
Just seems to me that it's far too early to put this one down to 'pilot error.' especially since the BEA's report leaves out so many things that the BEA must
already know?
Or does
anyone think that the two pilots on the flight deck only noted the 'change in law' and then said nothing else until the 'no indications' exchange after they'd lost 20,000 feet?
Or that the Captain, who got back to the flight deck in a commendably short time, said nothing at
all?