Denise
I suspect that is part of why the handling of stall warnings is handled badly. If the warning is supposed to be continuous then it should be continuous if the aircraft is detected to be stalled while in the air.
A significant consideration conflicting with that is the problem of spurious warnings. That is a non trivial human/machine interface problem that has to be addressed before a particular machine hits the field. For many systems, the weight on wheels switch feature that influences other systems is a way to deal with spurious warnings on the ground. But those can go bad also. I think we have a thread on an accident in Spain where that feature was part of the problem.
Don't assume pilots will figure out that the plane is still stalled and but that the stall warning stopped for some other reason. Don't assume a pilot who did the right thing will figure out that a new stall warning is misleading.
While I agree as a general principle, a driving design paradigm is stall avoidance. That is also a flight imperative __stall avoidance__ particularly in passenger carrying air transport. That mind set, or philosophy, will have knock on effects when the final design and integration decisions are made.
In this thread it has often been said that somehow the pilots seemed to not realize that they were stalled, or perhaps thought they had gone overspeed.
Those estimates are hopefully made as a best guess, since there is so much unknown about this accident.
With all respect to those who think the pilots had to be to blame, it is not likely that three experienced pilots all made such errors unless the instrumentation and the way it presented information to them misled them.
OR, and this is a big OR
Their understanding of what was displayed was influenced by training, environment, or being faced with a novel situation.