I would also suggest more caution in your final statement - you cannot know that if the airspeed systems functioned flawlessly then the accident wouldn't have happened. You can only surmise.
Respectfully disagree with your statement.
System failure is (based on information so far gleaned) the trigger. BEA had taken that tack long before the wreckage undersea was finally located. Pitot tube issues and recommendations pre-dated the retrieval of the FDRs. It appears that their first estimate was well formed.
The event chain needed a trigger. Absent airspeed system failure, transition out of normal law and trimmed/stable flight state not likely => thus manual flying not required => thus the curious 30 second input not induced=> and so on.
If you wish to focus on human factors, you'll get no argument from me, but the linkage to mechanical factors is critical to the event chain. (There is a valid line of inquiry regarding "how well do you know your machine, and how well can you know your machine?" that was much discussed in one of the earlier threads, over a year ago I think).
How a response to airspeed system malfunction issues
should have been addressed, and how the training of crews
should have been undertaken for a known failure mode, certainly points to the human factors which include systemic / corporate / cultural human factors.
Getting into a stall in this event chain is a subordinate line of inquiry to response to malfunction. Per your earlier perkins reference, this points to a systemic issue that gums raised.
If you don't expect a stall, if you aren't familiar with what it feels and looks like, and if you don't train for it (<= not sure how valid that statement is, training may vary considerably) it is quite possible to initially react in a sub optimal manner. At that point, you are playing catch up, or as we used to say, you are behind the aircraft.
Is that a human factor? Absolutely. So too is a an altimeter winding down and what it means to you as you assess your situation from the right hand, or left hand, seat. What do you "see," and what does it mean to you?
That's the fourth act of a five act play, however. What was the lead in to that point?
EDIT TO ADD for Machinebird:
Going back to a post I made a couple of days ago. It occurs to me that if the Flight Path Angle in the developed stall was around 45 degrees below the horizon, it would be necessary for the crew to push the nose down to at least 35 degrees below the horizon to break a stall.
No big deal to a fighter pilot with altitude.
FWIW, if this was happening at, say 15K versus 35K, stall AoA would be a bit higher, so not quite as much nose down ... right?
But that's a late in the game event.
Good point, though, in re what one is comfortable with.
What to me is more puzzling is the "why" behind why nose down inputs of lesser magnitude (when you didn't need something like 25-35 degress nose down pitch to unstall the beast) were not apparently made earlier in the process, closer to stall onset. This is where the interface of flight control and cockpit information resources strike me as having a critical interaction that opened the door to the condition, later, where your point on how much nose down you'd need to unstall the plane arrives.