The dates may have changed, the PM & CinC may have changed, the enemy may have changed. I would suggest the sentiment and thrust remains extant .
HEADQUARTERS FIGHTER COMMAND
ROYAL AIR FORCE,
BENTLEY PRIORY,
STANMORE,
MIDDLESEX.
SECRET
May 16, 1940
Sir,
I have the honour to refer to the very serious calls
which have recently been made upon the Home Defence Fighter'Units
in an attempt to stem the German invasion on the Continent.
2, I hope and believe that our Armies may yet be
victorious in France and Belgium, but we have to face the
possibility that they may be defeated.
3. In this case I presume that there is no-one who will
deny that England should fight on, even though the remainder of
the Continent of Europe is dominated by the Germans.
4. For this purpose it is necessary to retain some
minimum fighter strength in this country and I must request that
the Air Council will inform me what they consider this minimum
strength to be, in order that I may make my dispositions
accordingly.
5. I would remind the Air Council that the last estimate
which they made as to the force necessary to defend this country
was 52 Squadrons, and my strength has now been reduced to the
equivalent of 36 Squadrons.
6. Once a decision has been reached as to the limit on
which the Air Council and the Cabinet are prepared to stake the
existence of the country, it should be made clear to the Allied
Commanders on the Continent that not a single aeroplane from
Fighter Command beyond the limit will be sent across the Channel,
no matter how desperate the situation may become.
7. It will, of course, be remembered that the estimate
of 52 Squadrons was based on the assumption that the attack
would come from the eastwards except in so far as the defences
might be outflanked in flight. We have now to face the
possibility that attacks may come from Spain or even from the
North coast of France. The result is that our line is very
much extended at the same time as our resources are reduced.
8. I must point out that within the last few days the
equivalent of 10 Squadrons have been sent to France, that the
Hurricane Squadrons remaining in this country are seriously
depleted, and that the more Squadrons which are sent to France
the higher will be the wastage and the more insistent the
demands for reinforcements.
9. I must therefore request that as a matter of
paramount urgency the Air Ministry will consider and
decide what level of strength is to be left to the
Fighter Command for the defences of this country, and will
assure me that when this level has been reached, not one
fighter will be sent across the Channel however urgent
and insistent the appeals for help may be.
10. I believe that, if an adequate fighter force is
kept in this country, if the fleet remains in being, and
if Home Forces are suitably organised to resist invasion,
we should be able to carry on the war single handed for
some time, if not indefinitely. But, if the Home Defence
Force is drained away in desperate attempts to remedy the
situation in France, defeat in France will involve the
final, complete and irremediable defeat of this country.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
Air Chief Marshal,
Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief,
Fighter Command,Royal Air Force.